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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2007, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
one of the principal statutes enabling U.S. economic sanctions, has prohibited
any party from causing a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under its authority.1 When this statutory requirement appears in
regulatory text, however, it does so in two different forms. More commonly,
this prohibition is framed in general terms applicable to “[a]ny transaction,”
but sometimes this same restriction is phrased as applicable only to “[a]ny
transaction by a U.S. person or within the United States.”2 This difference in
phrasing may appear minor and indeed, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
does not seem to have intended to create two versions of the causation language having distinct meanings. The broader form of this language, however,
has been used on at least one occasion as the basis for government enforcement against non-U.S. parties based solely on the use of U.S. dollars in transactions with a sanctioned party that would be prohibited if performed by a
U.S. party.3 Where the broad causation provision has been used in this way,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department of
the Treasury based its theory of liability on the foreign party having caused a
U.S. entity to violate the sanctions regulations by way of the U.S. entity participating in the dollar clearing process.4
Part I of this Article discusses the different versions of the causation provisions found within the sanctions regulations and examines their relationship
to relevant statutes and Executive Orders. Part II reviews how a broad causation provision was used as the basis for the government enforcement action
brought by OFAC against CSE Global Limited and its subsidiary CSE
TransTel Pte Ltd. (TransTel). It also examines how OFAC has also brought
enforcement actions in the past based on similar facts but based instead on a
theory of export of financial services from the United States, either directly or
indirectly. This Article argues that the government’s use of the causation provisions therefore does not constitute an entirely new area of enforcement, even
though different regulatory provisions are used as the stated basis. Part III
explores the nature of U.S. dollar clearing and settlement, both in U.S. and
1

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (1977).
31 C.F.R. § 544.205 (2018). U.S. persons are generally defined in the OFAC regulations to include both individuals and entities. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.308 (1980).
3
Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control and CSE Global Limited and CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. (July 15, 2017), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/transtel_settlement.pdf [hereinafter TransTel Settlement Agreement].
4
Id.
2
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offshore payment systems, and concludes that U.S. dollar-denominated transactions generally do require the involvement of a U.S. party and thus necessarily cause a sanctions violation where the broad version of the causation
language is present or where a theory of indirect export of financial services
is used. Part IV analyzes how OFAC has publicized prohibitions concerning
the use of U.S. dollars in transactions with sanctioned entities and discusses
how those legal requirements might be made clearer and more broadly understandable in the future. Finally, Part V recommends that the causation provisions be made consistent and standardized into the more expansive form in
order to create transparency around the applicability of U.S. sanctions to transactions involving U.S. dollars.
II. BACKGROUND AND APPLICABLE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) within the U.S. Department
of the Treasury was created in 1950 and administers U.S. economic and trade
sanctions.5 Previously, asset controls were administered by the Office of Foreign Funds Control, created in 1940.6 OFAC’s authority to control assets is
based on several statutes, including among others the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA); the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (FNKDA); and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).7
IEEPA was enacted in 1977.8 The statute “grants the President extensive
power to regulate a variety of economic transactions during a state of emergency.”9 Pursuant to IEEPA, the President may declare a national emergency
to exercise powers under IEEPA “to deal with any unusual or extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside of the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States.”10 A list of Executive Orders (mainly issued under the authority of
IEEPA) relevant to the scope of this Article is detailed in the table found in
Part I.A.ii.

5
About, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://w
ww.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-con
trol.aspx (last updated Apr. 5, 2019, 5:53 PM).
6
Id.
7
31 C.F.R. pt. 501, app. A (2018).
8
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 2 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf.
9
Id.
10
50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1977).
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A. Prohibitions Against “Causing a Violation”
The laws, regulations, and orders governing U.S. sanctions may prohibit
not only certain types of conduct, but also, as described below, actions which
cause a violation of any of the terms of particular U.S. sanctions programs.
Such language is the subject of this Article and is referred to herein as “causation provisions” or “causation language.” Causation language appears
within the IEEPA statute itself (within the section describing penalties), as
well as in two different forms of regulatory prohibitions and in the penalties
sections of certain sanctions regulations.11 The different forms of the causation language are described in Section I.A.ii. of this Article.
i.

Statutory Language

Currently, 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (“Penalties”) states under paragraph (a) that
“[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to
violate, or cause a violation of any license order, regulation, or prohibition
issued under” Chapter 35 of Title 50 of the U.S. Code, namely IEEPA. This
specific language was added to the statute through the IEEPA Enhancement
Act, enacted in 2007.12 Paragraph (c) allows for a fine or imprisonment for
any person “who willfully commits, willfully attempts to commit, or willfully
conspires to commit, or aids and abets in the commission of, an unlawful act
described in subsection (a).” The IEEPA Enhancement Act also increased the
maximum civil penalty for violations of IEEPA, from $50,000 to $250,000
per violation, and also raised the maximum criminal penalty from $50,000 to
$1,000,000 per violation.13 The 2007 amendments also added conspiracy to
violate any IEEPA license, order, regulation, or prohibition as an act prohibited under the statute.14
The Penalties section of the original 1977 statute provided for the imposition of a civil penalty “on any person who violates any license, order, or regulation issued under this title,” or a criminal fine or term of imprisonment
upon “[w]hoever willfully violates any license, order, or regulation issued

11

50 U.S.C. § 1705(a).
Brad S. Karp et al., OFAC Breaks New Ground by Penalizing Non-U.S. Companies
for Making U.S. Dollar Payments Involving a Sanctioned Country, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/0
8/16/ofac-breaks-new-ground-by-penalizing-non-u-s-companies-for-making-u-s-dollar-p
ayments-involving-a-sanctioned-country/.
13
New Legislation Increases Penalties Under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 16, 2007), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-legislation
-increases-penalties-under-the-international-emergency-economic-powers-act/.
14
CASEY, supra note 8, at 12.
12
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under this title.”15 Causation and conspiracy were not in themselves included
as prohibited acts.16 While language was added to the Penalties section in
other amendments made to IEEPA between the enactment of the statute in
1977 and the passage of the IEEPA Enhancement Act in 2007 (for example,
allowing a civil penalty to be assessed for attempts to violate the statute), the
imposition of liability for causing a violation did not appear until the 2007
revisions.17
The causation language in the 2007 IEEPA Enhancement Act was in the
version of the bill passed by the Senate and subsequently the House of Representatives.18 The Senate Committee Report does not specifically address
why the causation language was being added to IEEPA, but instead commented generally on the intent of the IEEPA Enhancement Act to strengthen
the penalties available for violations of IEEPA, as “current penalties [were]
neither adequate nor proportionate in many cases, for deterring companies
from investing in bad actors.”19
ii.

Regulatory Language

The regulations implementing the various OFAC sanctions programs are
set forth in Title 31. Many of these sanctions programs contain some type of
provision prohibiting individuals and other entities from causing a violation
of that particular sanctions program (or in some cases, of any license, order,
or prohibition issued under IEEPA). This causation language appears in principally two different forms across different sanctions programs. One version
of this language is as follows: “Any transaction by a U.S. person or within the
United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding,
causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in
this part is prohibited.”20 In the table below, this language is denoted as “limited,” since it applies only to the conduct of U.S. persons or to actions taken
within the United States. As described in the table below, this limited causation language appears in the Syrian and Zimbabwean sanctions regulations.
A different version of the causation language appears in a larger number
of sanctions programs: “Any transaction . . . that evades or avoids, has the
purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate

15
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 206,
91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1705).
16
Id.
17
50 U.S.C. § 1705.
18
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (2007).
19
S. Rep. No. 110-82 (2007).
20
31 C.F.R. § 542.205(a) (2014).
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any of the prohibitions set forth in this part is prohibited.”21 In the table below,
this type of language is described as “expansive” because its reach is not limited to actions taken by U.S. persons or within the U.S. This Article also refers
to this version as “broad” causation language.
Some sanctions programs contain neither type of language, but instead allow for the imposition of penalties for causing a violation of IEEPA.22 This
language is similar to the expansive causation language and is as follows: “A
civil penalty not to exceed the amount set forth in Section 206 of the Act may
be imposed on any person who violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under the Act.”23 In the table below, this form of language is also described as “expansive,” but the fact that the language appears in the penalties
section of the sanctions program, rather than as a separate prohibition, is noted
next to the regulatory citation.
The following table summarizes the type of causation language appearing
in each U.S. sanctions program, along with the corresponding executive order
and the year of that order:
SancType
of E.O.
and Type of Regulation cite
tions
“causing a year
“causing (within Title 31
Program violation”
a viola- of the Code of
language
tion” lan- Federal Regulain E.O.
guage in tions)
regulation
North
Expansive
E.O.s 13466 Expan§ 510.212 (ImpleKorea
(13810,
(2008); 13551 sive
mented in current
13687 & (2010); 13570
form March 5,
13722);
(2011); 13687
2018; 83 Fed.
limited
(2015); 13722
Reg. 9182)
(13570 & (2016); 13810
13551);
(2017)
none
within
13466
Cuba
None
E.O
12854 None
n/a
(1993)
Iranian
None
E.O.s 12170 Expan§ 535.701 (penalAssets
(1979), 12205 sive
ties) (June 10,
(1980), 12211
21
22
23

31 C.F.R. § 560.203(a) (2012).
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 535.701 (2008).
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §561.07(a)(3) (2012).
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(1980), 12276
(1981), 12279
(1981), 12280
(1981), 12281
(1981), 12282
(1981), 12283
(1981), 12294
(1981)
E.O. 12978
(1995)24
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2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)

Narcotics

None

Expansive

Weapons
of Mass
Destruction
Trade
Control
Zimbabwe

None

E.O.s 12938
(1994); 13094
(1998);

Expansive

None

E.O.s 13469
(2008); 13391
(2005); 13288
(2003)

Syria

Limited

E.O. 13582
(2011)

Darfur

None

E.O. 13400
(2006)

Limited
in
541.204
and expansive
penalties
Limited
in
542.205
and expansive
penalties
Expansive

§ 536.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)
§ 539.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)
§ 541.204 (July
29, 2004; 69 Fed.
Reg. 45246) & §
541.207 (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)
§ 542.205 (2005)
& § 542.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)
§ 546.701 (penalties) (May 28,
2009; 74 Fed.
Reg. 25430)

24
Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.t
reasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/narco.aspx (last updated Aug. 21,
2019, 10:20 AM).
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Democratic
Republic
of
the
Congo
Belarus

Expansive
(13671);
none
in
original
E.O.
None

E.O.s 13413
(2006); 13671
(2014)25

Expansive

§ 547.20526 (Nov.
15, 2018; 83 Fed.
Reg. 57308)

E.O. 13405
(2006)

Expansive

Lebanon

None

E.O. 13441
(2007)

Expansive

Somalia

Limited

None

Yemen

Expansive

None

n/a

Central
African
Republic
Burundi

Expansive

E.O. 13536
(2010)
E.O. 13611
(2012)
E.O. 13667
(2014)

§ 548.701 (penalties) (February 3,
2010; 75 Fed.
Reg. 5502)
§ 549.701 (penalties) (July 30,
2010; 75 Fed.
Reg. 44907)
n/a

None

n/a

None

n/a

South
Sudan
Iranian
Transactions

Expansive

E.O. 13712
(2015)
E.O. 13664
(2014)
E.O.s 12613
(1987); 12957
(1995); 12959

None

n/a

Expansive

§ 560.203 & §
560.701 (penalties)27 (June 10,

Expansive

None
(12613,
12957,

25
Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://w
ww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/drc.aspx (last updated Nov.
15, 2018, 4:58 PM).
26
31 C.F.R. § 547.205 (2018).
27
31 C.F.R. § 560.701(a)(3) (as amended in 2019) states:
As set forth in section 218 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (Pub. L. 112-158), a civil penalty not to exceed the
amount set forth in section 206 of IEEPA may be imposed on a United
States person if an entity owned or controlled by the United States person
and established or maintained outside the United States violates, attempts
to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of the prohibition set
forth in § 560.215 or of any order, regulation or license set forth in or
issued pursuant to this part concerning such prohibition. The penalties
set forth in this paragraph shall not apply with respect to a transaction
described in § 560.215 by an entity owned or controlled by the United
States person and established or maintained outside the United States if
the United States person divests or terminates its business with the entity
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12959,
13059);
Limited
(13599);
Expansive
(13268)
None
(12957);
Limited
(13599);
Expansive
(13622,
13628)

(1995); 13059
(1997); 13599
(2012); 13268
(2012)

Iranian
Human
Rights
Hizbollah Financial

Limited

E.O. 13553
(2010)

None

None

Expansive

§ 566.202 & §
566.701 (penalties) (Apr. 15,
2016; 81 Fed.
Reg. 22185)

Libya

Limited

None

n/a

Iraq stabilization
and insurgency

None

Expansive

§ 576.701 (penalties) (Sept. 13,
2010) (75 Fed.
Reg. 55463)

Cyberrelated
Foreign
Interference in

Expansive

E.O.s 12947
(1995); 13099
(1998); 13224
(2001); 13268
(2001); 13372
(2005)28
E.O. 13566
(2011)
E.O.s 13303
(2003), 13315
(2003), 13350
(2004), 13438
(2007), 13668
(2014)
E.O. 13694
(2015)
E.O. 13848
(2018)

None

n/a

None

n/a

Iranian
Financial

Expansive

E.O.s
(1995),
(2012),
(2012),
(2102)

12957
13599
13622
13628

2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)

Expansive

§ 561.205 & §
561.701(a)(1) &
(3)
(penalties)
(Aug. 16, 2010)
(75 Fed. Reg.
49836)
(additional,
limited
penalties in (a)(2))
n/a

not later than February 6, 2013, such that the U.S. person no longer owns
or controls the entity, as defined in § 560.215(b)(1).
28
Counter Terrorism Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.go
v/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/terror.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 2019, 1:06
PM).
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U.S.
Elections
Nicaragua
Global
Magnitsky

Expansive
Expansive

E.O. 13851
(2018)
E.O. 13818
(2017)

None

n/a

Reference
within
E.O.s
only
Expansive

n/a

Magnitsky Act

n/a

n/a

Western
Balkan
Stabilization
Ukraine

None

E.O.s 13304
(2001); 13219
(2001)29

Expansive

Expansive

E.O.s 13660,
13661, 13662
(2014)

Transnational
Criminal
Organizations
Venezuela

Limited

E.O. 13581
(2011)

Reference
within
E.O.s
only
Reference
within
E.O. only

Expansive

E.O. 13692
(2015)

Rough
diamonds

None

E.O. 13312
(2003)30

Reference
within
E.O. only
None

39

§ 584.205 & §
584.701 (penalties) (both Dec.
21, 2017; 82 Fed.
Reg. 60507)
§ 588.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)
Apps. A, B, C to
Part 589

App. A to Part 590

App. A to Part 591

n/a

29
Balkans-Related Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/r
esource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/balkans.aspx (last updated July 26, 2019, 2:49
PM).
30
Rough Diamond Trade Controls, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/diamond.aspx (last updated Mar. 28, 2019,
12:21 PM).
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Global
Terrorism

None

Terrorism

None

Terrorism List
Governments
Foreign
Terrorist
Organizations

n/a

Foreign
Narcotics
Kingpin

None

None
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E.O.s 12947
(1995); 13099
(1998); 13224
(2001); 13268
(2001); 13372
(2005)31
E.O.s 12947
(1995); 13099
(1998); 13224
(2001); 13268
(2001); 13372
(2005)32
n/a

Expansive

§ 594.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)

Expansive

§ 595.701 (penalties) (June 10,
2008; 73 Fed.
Reg. 32652)

None

n/a

E.O.s 12947
(1995); 13099
(1998); 13224
(2001); 13268
(2001); 13372
(2005)33
N/A (regulations implemented Kingpin Act, 21
U.S.C.
§§
1901-1908
and 8 U.S.C. §
1182)34

None

n/a

None

n/a

In addition, the Sudanese sanctions regulations have now been revoked,
but contained an expansive version of the causation language in the penalties
section only, added in 2008. Similar language appeared in the relevant penalties sections of the Burmese, Taliban (Afghanistan), Yugoslavia/Bosnia, former Liberian regime of Charles Taylor and highly enriched uranium sanctions
31

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28.
Id.
33
Id.
34
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, NARCOTICS SANCTIONS PROGRAM (2014), https:
//www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/drugs.pdf.
32
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regulations, among others.35 Executive Order 13882, announcing Mali-related
sanctions on July 26, 2019, contained a broad causation provision.36
iii.

Analysis of Regulatory Language

As a preliminary point, the broad version of the causation language,
whether in place as a separate prohibition or in a penalties section, appears
much more frequently across OFAC sanctions programs than does the more
limited causation language. Only the Syria and Zimbabwe sanctions programs
contain the limited version of the causation language, although the limited
causation language also appears in certain Executive Orders related to additional sanctions programs (such as Somalia, Libya, and transnational criminal
organizations, among others).37 There does not appear to be a relationship between the overall restrictiveness of a sanctions program and the specific type
of causation language used within that program. The Syrian sanctions program, for example, “is one of the most comprehensive sanctions programs
currently implemented by OFAC,” and contains blanket restrictions on the
“exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of” services into Syria.38 Despite
this, the Syrian sanctions regulations contain the limited type of causation language. Other sanctions programs only target certain named individuals but
nonetheless use the expansive causation language (such as, for example, the
Western Balkan stabilization program).39
It is not entirely clear why these differences in causation language appear
across sanctions programs, across Executive Orders, and between authorizing
Executive Orders and regulatory language related to the same sanctions program. More recent regulations and Executive Orders seem to more frequently
contain expansive causation language as a separate prohibition.40 One event
explains the timing of the expansive penalties language: the 2007 enhancements to the IEEPA Act changed the penalties sections, described above, to
include penalties for causation actions where no such liability had explicitly

35
31 C.F.R. § 537 (2016) (Burmese); 31 C.F.R. §545 (2009) (Taliban); 31 C.F.R. § 586
(2000) (Yugoslavia/Bosnia); 31 C.F.R. § 593 (2016) (Former Liberian Regime of Charles
Taylor).
36
Exec. Order. No. 13882, 3 C.F.R. § 5(a) (2019).
37
31 C.F.R. § 542.205 (2014) (Syria); 31 C.F.R. § 541.204 (2006) (Zimbabwe); Exec.
Order No. 13,536, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 12, 2010) (Somalia); Exec. Order No. 13,566,
76 Fed. Reg. 11,315 (Feb. 25, 2011) (Libya); Exec. Order No. 13,581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,757
(July 24, 2011) (transnational criminal organizations).
38
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SYRIA SANCTIONS PROGRAM (2013), https://ww
w.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/syria.pdf (citing Exec. Order No. 13582, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,209 (Aug. 22, 2011)).
39
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 29.
40
See generally sanction chart, supra pp. 35-41.
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existed in those penalties sections before.41 Namely, before the IEEPA Enhancement Act was passed, the relevant penalty section (e.g., 31 C.F.R. §
538.701) provided that “[a] civil penalty not to exceed $50,000 per violation
may be imposed on any person who violates any license, order, or regulation
issued under the Act.” The language was amended by the IEEPA Enhancement Act42 to state that “[a] civil penalty not to exceed the amount set forth in
Section 206 of the Act may be imposed on any person who … causes a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under” IEEPA. All
the instances of expansive causation language that appear in the penalties sections of sanctions programs were added after the time of the IEEPA Enhancement Act. These sections appear to have been added with the intent of penalizing actions causing violations of any of the prohibitions of IEEPA, and there
is no evidence to suggest an intent to implement these penalties provisions in
order to widen the jurisdictional reach of the sanctions regulations beyond
what the limited version of the causation language was intended to address (as
discussed in greater detail below).
There does not appear to be any relationship between the type of causation
language that appears in an Executive Order and that appearing in the corresponding regulatory language. For example, the Zimbabwe sanctions regulations contain a limited causation provision, but no reference to causation was
made in the corresponding Executive Orders.43 The causation language that
appears in the authorizing Executive Order44 related to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR)45 is limited; the causation language
within the ITSR themselves, however, is expansive. The fact that the ITSR
Executive Order with its limited causation language was translated into the
more general provision in the ITSR might indicate that the two versions were
intended to have the same effect–namely, to be limited to U.S. persons and
U.S. transactions–and that the omission of the limiting language in the ITSR
was not intended to have a practical difference as to the reach of that section.
The theory that the two forms of causation provisions were intended to
have the same jurisdictional reach (namely, to actions taken by U.S. persons
or within the United States) is further supported by the Federal Register Notice in which the causation provision in the North Korean sanctions regulations, which appears in the broader form, is nevertheless discussed as being
41
See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 32,652 (June 10, 2008) (“OFAC is amending the current
IEEPA-based sanctions programs regulations to reflect the revised description of unlawful
acts and the revised penalties prescribed by the Act”).
42
IEEPA Civil and Criminal Penalties, 31 C.F.R. §537.701(a)(1) (2008).
43
See Exec. Order No. 13,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,457 (Mar. 6, 2003); Exec. Order No.
13,391, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,201 (Nov. 22, 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,469, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,841
(July 25, 2008); cf. 31 C.F.R. § 541.204.
44
Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (2012).
45
31 C.F.R. § 560.
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limited to transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States.46 Specifically, 31 C.F.R. § 510.212 (within the North Korean sanctions regulations)
itself includes the expansive causation language.47 However, the Federal Register Notice amending the North Korean sanctions regulations comments that
“[s]ection 510.212 further contains the additional prohibition, included in all
but the first order but available for all IEEPA-based prohibitions, on any transaction by a U.S. person or within the United States that causes a violation of
any of the prohibitions in any of the orders.”48 This perhaps indicates that at
the time of the amendment of the North Korean sanctions regulations, OFAC
considered the expansive prohibition language to be a prohibition relating
only to transactions by a U.S. person or occurring within the United States.49
Moreover, the fact that the Zimbabwean and Syrian sanctions regulations
contain a limited causation provision as a separate prohibition but expansive
causation language within their respective penalties section seems to indicate
that the presence of expansive language in the penalties section is not necessarily intended to extend potential liability to actions taken outside of the
United States or by persons outside of the United States. The expansive language of the penalties section might not necessarily extend the jurisdictional
reach of a limited causation provision which appears as a separate prohibition.
The broad and limited causation provisions appear to constitute a different
set of legal requirements despite having been intended to have the same effect,
namely, to be limited to actions taken within the United States or by U.S.
parties. The broad causation provisions appear to have been drafted as a sort
of shorthand version of the more limited causation language. Despite the clues
noted above as to the intent of the drafters, it seems (as described within this
Article) that OFAC currently interprets the sanctions causation provisions according to their plain text. This next Part of this Article explores the principles
that appear to govern OFAC’s use of the causation principles as the basis for
government enforcement of the sanctions regulations. Part II also discusses
an alternative theory of liability used by OFAC with respect to the use of U.S.
dollars overseas in transactions with sanctioned parties.
46

83 Fed. Reg. 9182 (Mar. 5, 2018); cf. 31 C.F.R. §510.212 (2018).
31 C.F.R. §510.212 (2018).
48
North Korean Sanctions Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg. 9182, 9182-83 (Mar. 5, 2018)
(amending the North Korean sanctions regulations contained at 31 C.F.R. § 510 and reissuing them in their entirety) (emphasis added).
49
It should be noted, however, that the TransTel settlement (discussed in greater detail
in Part II.A), in which a broad causation provision was used to support a theory of liability
based on actions taken outside the United States. and by non-U.S. entities, had occurred
nearly eight months earlier, in July 2017. It is possible that the division of OFAC responsible for the TransTel settlement was not fully aligned with the division of the office responsible for the amendment of the North Korean sanctions regulations. It is also possible
that, for some reason, OFAC saw a difference in jurisdictional reach between the North
Korean sanctions regulations and the ITSR (although that difference is not reflected in any
textual difference in the causation provisions of these programs).
47
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III. OFAC ENFORCEMENT: CAUSATION PROVISIONS AND OTHER
MECHANISMS
Regardless of the type of conduct the broad causation language was originally meant to encompass, the expansive causation language has since been
used by OFAC as the basis for enforcement against conduct taken outside the
United States and by non-U.S. parties, based on the nexus of U.S. financial
institutions being involved during the course of U.S. dollar transactions.50
This Part describes the background of the TransTel settlement and the legal
theory of causation upon which OFAC described TransTel’s liability. This
Part also discusses other OFAC enforcement actions that were brought under
similar, but slightly different, legal theories and facts, including cases brought
under the theory of indirect export of financial services from the United States
and that of causing a violation by U.S. financial institutions through more active concealment of the involvement of a sanctioned entity. As such, this Article proposes that OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions did not penalize a type of conduct that it had not already exercised jurisdiction over by
other means. The other actions discussed in this Part besides TransTel were
all brought against financial institutions, however, and the use of the causation
provisions might therefore constitute a new tool for OFAC to penalize different types of actors for their use of the U.S. dollar in connection with transactions with sanctioned parties. Finally, this Part examines how the nature of
OFAC enforcement through an alternative theory of liability may render
transactions with sanctioned parties violations of the OFAC regulations even
50
TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3; Settlement Agreement Between U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Lloyds TS Bank, PLC (Dec.
22, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Doc
uuments/lloyds_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Lloyds Settlement Agreement]; Settlement
Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and
Credit Suisse AG (Dec. 16, 2000), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/santions/OF
AC-Enforcement/Documents/12162009.pdf [hereinafter Credit Suisse AG Settlement
Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and BNP Paribas SA 8 (Jun. 30, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/r
esource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20140630.aspx [hereinafter BNP
Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Barclays Bank PLC (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20160208.
aspx [hereinafter Barclays Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement Between U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and UniCredit Bank AG at ¶5
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/2
0190415_unicredit_bank_ag.pdf [hereinafter UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement];
Settlement Agreement Between U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Standard Chartered Bank (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/scb_settlement.pdf [hereinafter Standard Chartered Bank
Settlement Agreement].
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in the context of sanctions programs with the limited version of the causation
language.
A. Enforcement Actions
i.

TransTel

The TransTel settlement stemmed from an enforcement action brought by
OFAC against CSE Global Limited (“CSE”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary,
CSE TransTel Pte. Ltd. (“TransTel”).51 TransTel was based in Singapore and
supplied telecommunications to the oil and gas sector.52 TransTel allegedly
“entered into contracts with, and received purchase orders from, multiple Iranian companies” (at least two of which were contained on OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List).53 TransTel also hired
Iranian companies to provide goods and services in connection with these
contracts and purchase orders.54 According to OFAC, between June 2012 and
March 2013, TransTel originated 104 funds transfers relating to Iran or Iranian persons in some way, totaling $11,111,812 from its account denominated
in U.S. dollars at a non-U.S. financial institution based in Singapore.55 All of
these funds transfers “were processed through the United States and caused
multiple financial institutions–including several U.S. financial institutions–to
engage in the prohibited exportation or re-exportation of financial services
from the United States to Iran.”56 OFAC alleged that on this basis, and because
TransTel appeared to have “explicit knowledge and reason to know” of the
Iranian connection with respect to these transactions, TransTel appeared to
have violated § 1705(a) of IEEPA (making it unlawful for a person to violate
or cause a violation of any IEEPA prohibition or regulation) and/or § 560.203
of the ITSR (the ITSR causation provision).57 Pursuant to the July 2017 settlement agreement, CSE and TransTel agreed to pay a total penalty of approximately $12 million to OFAC.58
The TransTel settlement was widely regarded as being based on a new type
of jurisdictional theory–namely, the use of the causation provisions to hold a
non-U.S. party responsible for violations of U.S. sanctions based solely on its

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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use of the U.S. dollar.59 However, as described below, the TransTel settlement
was perhaps a logical extension of, and conceptually very similar to, prior and
subsequent OFAC cases in which foreign parties were penalized for directly
or indirectly exporting financial services from the United States to sanctioned
parties or countries.
ii.

Lloyds

In December 2009, OFAC entered into a settlement agreement with Lloyds
TSB Bank, plc (“Lloyds”), a financial institution organized under the laws of
England and Wales.60 Lloyds participated in conduct including “intentionally
manipulating and deleting information in wire transfer instructions executed”
on behalf of Iranian customers and those in Sudan and Libya; this “policy of
manipulating information in wire transfer instructions was memorialized in
writing and approved by senior managers within Lloyds.”61 Thus, according
to the settlement, at least 4,200 electronic transfers were routed by Lloyds “to
or through third-party banks located in the United States, in apparent violation
of IEEPA and OFAC regulations related to Iran, Sudan, and Libya.”62 These
violations did not involve either of Lloyds’ two U.S. branches.
The settlement agreement described that the apparent violations involved
the following:
(1) the exportation of services by Lloyds from the United
States to Iran or the Government of Iran; (2) the exportation of
services by Lloyds from the United States to Sudan or the Government of Sudan; (3) the transfer, payment, exportation, withdrawal, or other dealings by Lloyds in property or interests in
property of the Government of Sudan that were in or came
within the United States; and (4) the transfer, payment, exportation, withdrawal, or other dealings by Lloyds in property or
interests in property of the Government of Libya that were or
came within the United States during the pendency of U.S.
sanctions against Libya.63

59

See, e.g., OFAC Pushes New Limits on Jurisdiction of U.S. Sanctions by Penalizing
Non-U.S. Companies for “Causing” Violations by U.S. Dollars Payments, AKIN GUMP
(Aug. 10, 2017) https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/ofac-pushes-new-limits-onjurisdiction-of-u-s-sanctions-by.html; see also Karp et al., supra note 12.
60
Lloyds Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
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This matter therefore involved a sanctions program in which no causation
provision was present (Libya); one in which the causation provision appeared
in broad form but only in the penalties section (Iran); and one in which there
was a separate causation prohibition (Iran). Causation was nowhere mentioned in the Lloyds settlement agreement as a basis of liability, but the concept of causing U.S. financial institutions to commit U.S. sanctions violations
appeared to form the basis for this enforcement action. Indeed, a 2009 article
noted that the Lloyds case “appear[ed] to mark the first time the DOJ . . . asserted jurisdiction over a non-U.S. person whose conduct occurred entirely
outside the United States, but which caused OFAC violations by a non-affiliated U.S. person.”64 Moreover, “the stripping of transactions by Lloyds appears to have occurred without any participation by its U.S. affiliates or employees,” and as such “the only link between Lloyds and the United States
appears to have been the transmittal of payment instructions to U.S. financial
institutions, which in turn violated OFAC sanctions, albeit unknowingly, by
processing those requests.”65
Thus, while TransTel was not a financial institution as was Lloyds, the
essential theory of liability–causing U.S. financial institutions to process
transactions involving U.S.-sanctioned parties–was essentially the same. The
TransTel case, therefore, did not necessarily introduce an entirely novel theory of liability in the form of causation. As described in the cases below,
OFAC continued to use the theory of export of financial services as the basis
for enforcement actions both before and after the TransTel settlement was entered into.
iii.

Credit Suisse

Also in 2009, OFAC, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the New York
County District Attorney’s Office entered into a settlement agreement with
Credit Suisse AG for a total of $536 million.66 The Credit Suisse matter involved allegations that Credit Suisse had “engaged in payment processes that
prevented U.S. financial institutions from identifying the involvement of U.S.
sanctions targets in funds transfers processed to and through the United
States.”67 Among other allegations, these payment processes included the following types of conduct:
64
New Enforcement Action Highlights Potential OFAC Risks for Non-U.S. Financial
Institutions, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Jan. 14, 2009), https://www.clear
ygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/new-enforcement-action-highlights-p
otential-ofac-risks-for-non-us-financial-institutions22?search=.
65
Id.
66
U.S. Treasury Dep’t Announces Joint $536 Million Settlement with Credit Suisse AG,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 16, 2009), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press
-releases/Pages/tg452.aspx.
67
Credit Suisse AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
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[O]mitting or removing information referencing sanctioned locations, entities or individuals; forwarding payment messages
to U.S. financial institutions that referenced Credit Suisse as
the ordering institution and that omitted the identity of the actual originating bank; filling the field on Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) payment messages that indicated the originator or replacing the
names of ordering customers on such payment messages with
references to Credit Suisse or with phrases such as “Order of
a Customer’; and using cover payments to avoid referencing
parties subject to U.S. sanctions.68
Credit Suisse’s conduct was alleged to have violated the OFAC prohibitions against the “exportation, . . . directly or indirectly, from the United
States, . . . of any services to Iran or the Government of Iran”69 through processing electronic funds transfers through financial institutions located in the
United States. Credit Suisse was also alleged to have violated similar prohibitions with respect to Burma, Sudan, Cuba, Libya, and Liberia, based on the
same type of conduct.70 This enforcement action was not based on the causation provisions themselves, but as was the case in the Lloyds settlement, was
based instead on the OFAC regulations prohibiting the export of financial services to sanctioned parties, directly or indirectly, from the United States.71
However, as was also the case for the Lloyd and TransTel settlements, the type
of action penalized in this settlement was that of causing U.S. financial institutions to violate the sanctions regulations by providing financial services to
sanctioned parties.72
iv.

BNP Paribas

BNP Paribas, BA (BNPP) entered into a combined $8.9 billion state and
federal settlement in June 2014, $963 million of which was with OFAC.73 As
part of the settlement, BNPP was “restricted from performing certain dollarclearing functions through its New York office for a period of a year starting

68

Id.
Id. (citing 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2011)).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing
Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to U.S. Economic Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (June 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guiltyand-pay-89-billion-illegally-processing-financial.
69
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in January 2015.”74 BNPP was alleged to have violated the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations, the ITSR, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, and the
Burmese Sanctions Regulations.75
According to the settlement agreement with OFAC, “BNPP processed
thousands of transactions to or through U.S. financial institutions that involved countries, entities, and/or individuals subject to the sanctions programs
administered by OFAC.”76 In the course of those transactions, BNPP was alleged to have “engaged in a systematic practice, spanning many years and
involving multiple BNPP branches and business lines, that concealed, removed, omitted, or obscured references to, or the interest or involvement of,
sanctioned parties in U.S. Dollar (USD) Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) payment messages sent to U.S. financial institutions.”77 These actions included “omitting references to sanctioned
parties; replacing the names of sanctioned parties with BNPP’s name or a code
word; and structuring payments in a manner that did not identify the involvement of sanctioned parties in payments sent to U.S. financial institutions.”78
Therefore, OFAC alleged that BNPP appeared to have conveyed the services
of U.S. banks to recipients in sanctioned parties, and directly or indirectly exported financial services to those parties.79
Moreover, legal advice provided to BNPP indicated that non-U.S.
branches of foreign banks were prohibited from processing sanctions-related
transactions through the U.S. The opinion noted: “if the use of the unaffiliated
[U.S.] bank were perceived to result from an effort by the foreign bank to
avoid the involvement of its U.S. branch in handling prohibited transactions,
there is a substantial risk either that regulators or prosecutors” would argue
that the foreign bank was a covered person under the CACR or the ITSR, or
that such a transaction would be considered a prohibited evasion under those
sanctions programs.80 This legal opinion therefore indicates that even prior to
the time of the BNPP settlement in 2014, BNPP’s legal counsel understood
that causing U.S. financial institutions to handle transactions that involved
sanctioned parties would be prohibited by OFAC. The TransTel settlement of
2017, then, did not introduce an entirely new prohibition against involving

74
Andrew R. Johnson, 5 Things on Dollar Clearing and BNP Paribas, WALL ST. J.
(June 30, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2014/06/30/5-things-on-dollar-clearing-and
-bnp-paribas/.
75
Enforcement Information for June 30, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.tr
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20140630_bnp.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019).
76
BNP Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
77
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Id.
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Id.
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U.S. financial institutions in transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties by way
of dollar clearing and settlement.
v.

Barclays

In 2016, OFAC entered into a $2.4 million settlement with Barclays Bank
PLC for processing dollar-denominated transactions for Barclays Bank of
Zimbabwe Limited (BBZ) involving entities owned over 50% by SDNs.81
OFAC’s 50% Rule treats an entity as a blocked person when it is owned in
the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50% or more by one or more blocked
persons.82 BBZ’s sanctions screening system had shortcomings that did not
allow it to “effectively capture or otherwise identify all of its customers’ beneficial owners in the bank’s electronic system.”83 As a result of this deficiency,
BBZ maintained U.S. dollar accounts for three corporate customers that were
blocked by way of the 50% Rule, although not themselves specifically named
to the SDN List, and BBZ “continued to process USD transactions for or on
their behalf to or through the United States in apparent violation of the ZSR.”84
Approximately $3.375 million in transactions were processed to or through
financial institutions located in the United States, including Barclay’s New
York Branch, on behalf of BBZ.85 OFAC found that these 159 funds transfers
“conferred economic benefit to, and provided indirect access to the U.S. financial system for, blocked persons, causing harm to the Zimbabwe sanctions
program and its associated policy objectives.”86 Given that Zimbabwe is one
of the two sanctions programs containing the limited version of the causation
language, OFAC’s theory of liability would most likely have to have been
based on the export of financial services to Zimbabwe rather than on the causation language. Such transactions could only be sanctionable by OFAC under
a causation theory if they had been effected in the United States or by a U.S.
person.

81
Jessica Piquet Megaw, OFAC Penalizes Barclays for Zimbabwe Sanctions Violations,
STEPTOE INT’L COMPLIANCE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.steptoeinternationalcompl
ianceblog.com/2016/02/ofac-penalizes-barclays-for-zimbabwe-sanctions-violations/.
82
Id.
83
Enforcement Information for February 8, 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://ww
w.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20160208_barclays.pdf
(last visited Nov 11, 2019).
84
Id.
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UniCredit

In April 2019, OFAC entered into a settlement totaling $611 million with
three UniCredit Group banks located in Germany, Austria, and Italy.87 A related cease and desist order in an action before the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System noted that these overseas offices “processed certain
U.S. dollar-denominated funds transfers” through their own U.S. branch as
well as other unaffiliated U.S. financial institutions.88 The UniCredit overseas
offices, moreover, omitted relevant information from payment messages that
prevented their U.S. branch and the other U.S. financial institutions from determining that their carrying out these transactions would result in violations
of the OFAC regulations.89
Specifically, UniCredit Bank AG operated U.S. dollar accounts on behalf
of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) (Iran’s national maritime
carrier, blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13599, among other provisions90) and other companies owned or affiliated with IRISL.91 Moreover,
separately from these actions, UniCredit Bank AG’s head office, several
branches, and a subsidiary “appear to have employed a practice of processing
USD payments through financial institutions in the United States on behalf of
persons subject to other U.S. sanctions programs in a manner that did not disclose the interest of the sanctioned parties from U.S. financial institutions.”92
Public statements made by U.S. government officials in connection with
this settlement reiterated that the UniCredit Group banks had used the U.S.
financial system in connection with transactions with sanctioned parties. Sigal
P. Mandelker, then-Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, noted that “UniCredit Group banks
routed transactions through the United States in a non-transparent manner,
when those payments would have been blocked or rejected if their true nature
had been clear, in violation of multiple sanctions programs.”93 OFAC Director
Andrea M. Gacki noted that OFAC would “continue to investigate institutions
that utilize the U.S. financial system in a manner that undermines U.S

87
U.S. Treasury Announces Settlement with UniCredit Group Banks, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (Apr. 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm658.
88
Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued
Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended, Docket Nos.
19-017-B-FB, 19-017-CMP-FB, (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors) (Apr. 15, 2019), available
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20190415a1.pdf.
89
Id.
90
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), IRAN WATCH (Dec. 10, 2018), https:/
/www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-republic-iran-shipping-lines-irisl.
91
UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
92
Id. at ¶ 26.
93
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 87.
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sanctions programs.”94 As these statements indicate, the allegations that the
UniCredit banks had caused U.S. financial institutions to violate the OFAC
sanctions regulations were an important part of the facts of this matter, even
if OFAC did not pursue this action based on the causation provision itself.
The facts of this case are different from those of the TransTel matter, beyond the identity of the UniCredit banks as financial institutions while
TransTel was not, in that the UniCredit banks acted willfully and fraudulently
in conducting some of the activities described in the settlement agreement, as
they intentionally hid the presence of sanctioned parties in USD transactions.
For example, the charged conduct included UniCredit Bank AG’s processing
of “USD payments in a non-transparent manner – for example, by confirming
that payment instructions did not include references to U.S.-sanctioned persons and countries – through financial institutions in the United States on behalf of persons subject to the WMDPSR and other U.S. sanctions programs.”95
Causation was not specifically referenced by OFAC as a basis of the
UniCredit enforcement action. Instead, the settlement agreement referenced
the various prohibitions against the export of services and transaction with
blocked persons.96 The language within the settlement agreement describing
UniCredit activities, however, does indicate UniCredit’s role in causing U.S.
parties to violate OFAC sanctions regulations.97 Thus, the type of conduct penalized was essentially the same as that which could have been penalized under a broad version of the causation provision instead.
vii.

Standard Chartered

Also in April 2019, OFAC entered into a settlement agreement with Standard Chartered Bank (Standard Chartered), a financial institution organized under the laws of England and Wales with a branch office in New York.98 OFAC
had previously entered into a 2012 settlement with Standard Chartered Bank
for violations of the ITSR, the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, the Libyan Sanctions regulations, the Burmese Sanctions Regulations, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, as the bank “engaged in payment practices that impaired compliance with U.S. economic sanctions by financial
94

Id.
Enforcement Information for April 15, 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.tr
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20190415_uni_webpost.pdf
(last visited Nov 11, 2019).
96
Id. at 95 at ¶¶ 35-45.
97
“It appears that UWC [unit of UniCredit responsible for financial sanctions compliance] employees understood their U.S. correspondents had obligations pursuant to U.S.
sanctions laws not to process certain transactions involving sanctioned entities or interests.” Id. at ¶ 30.
98
Standard Chartered Bank Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
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institutions in the United States,” including by Standard Chartered’s U.S.
branch in New York.99 The April 2019 settlement agreement stated that
“OFAC determined that the transactions [Standard Chartered] processed to or
though the United States” involving certain corporate entities initiating payment instructions from Iran “constitute[d] apparent violations of § 560.204 of
the ITSR,” namely, the prohibitions on the exportation, reexportation, sale, or
supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran.100 Again, as in the matters
described above besides TransTel, OFAC based the 2019 Standard Chartered
enforcement action against a financial institution on the prohibitions against
the export of services to Iran, but the conduct penalized was conceptually the
same as actions prohibited under the broad version of the causation provision.
B. Analysis
i.

Causation vs. Export of Financial Services as a Basis for Liability

The TransTel settlement was seen as a new area of enforcement due to
OFAC’s use of a causation provision as a basis for liability, but the novelty of
the TransTel enforcement action was perhaps due more to OFAC’s specific
citation of that language as the theory of liability rather than OFAC’s use of
an entirely new area of enforcement conceptually. Indeed, a 2016 Southern
District of New York opinion cited the following contention that the U.S. government made in one of its filings for that case: “[i]t has been clear for a long
time that foreign nationals are not permitted to use the U.S. financial system
to conduct transactions that are for the benefit of Iran or for the government
of Iran.”101 The court did not specify exactly how long this rule had been clear,
but the 2016 opinion did predate the 2017 TransTel settlement agreement.
Thus, the enforcement stance in TransTel could not have by itself created a
novel blanket prohibition against the use of the U.S. financial system with
respect to Iran or other comprehensively sanctioned countries.
Further, the other enforcement actions described above were also brought
by OFAC based on prohibited uses of the U.S. dollar in transactions with
sanctioned parties, even if the prohibited conduct was characterized as directly
or indirectly exporting financial services instead of causing others to violate
the sanctions regulations. The TransTel settlement thus perhaps constituted a
novel case because of the specific provision used by OFAC as the basis for
that enforcement action, but not due to any novel prohibition in the type of
conduct prohibited by the sanctions regulations. Causation, even where not
specifically referenced by OFAC in enforcement actions other than the
99

Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 43.
101
United States v. Zarrab, No. 1:15-cr-000867, 2016 WL 6820737, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 17, 2016).
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TransTel case, nevertheless played an important role in those fact patterns;
many of the financial institutions in the settlements described above were penalized for their role in causing the funds transfers made by unrelated U.S.
financial institutions and omitting or deleting information that would have
prevented those U.S. financial institutions from committing sanctions violations. Whether OFAC’s theory of liability was based on the causation provisions as in TransTel, or on the indirect export of financial services to blocked
parties, the end result was the same: a non-U.S. party was held responsible for
causing U.S. financial institutions to process U.S. dollar-denominated transactions involving blocked parties.
There are, however, certain factors that distinguish TransTel and its causation theory of liability from the other (both earlier and later) OFAC enforcement actions discussed within this Part and the concept of export of financial
services from the United States. Most notably, neither CSE Global nor its subsidiary TransTel were financial institutions, as were the alleged wrongdoers
in the other OFAC enforcement actions discussed. Thus the TransTel case
represented a new type of action not because the causation theory was inherently different from the theory of export of financial services to a sanctioned
party, but because the party against whom the enforcement action was brought
played a different role in the transaction and was not directly involved in the
dollar clearing and settlement process, other than entering into the relevant
U.S. dollar-denominated transactions.
A theory of causation was perhaps necessary for OFAC to bring the
TransTel enforcement action, or was at least better-suited to that particular
matter, because a theory of export of financial services would be even more
attenuated where the respondent was not itself a financial institution or involved in the dollar-clearing process. While TransTel and the financial institutions discussed above both actively omitted identifying details that would
have allowed U.S. financial institutions to recognize that the transactions involved a sanctioned party, the omissions made by TransTel were less directly
tied to the dollar clearing and settlement process, since TransTel itself did not
directly take part in the payment process. Likewise, other differences between
TransTel and the other alleged sanctions violators that might explain why
OFAC used a causation theory instead that of export of financial services included the financial sophistication of the parties, size of their operations,
closer ties with U.S. financial institutions, knowledge of the dollar clearing
process, and potential level of control over the dollar clearing process. While
on a practical level, the nature of the conduct penalized was the same, OFAC
might have chosen to base its enforcement action in TransTel on the causation
language, rather than on the export of services prohibitions, based on these
factors.

2019]
ii.

CAUSING A SANCTIONS VIOLATION WITH U.S. DOLLARS

55

Prohibitions on the Direct or Indirect Export of Financial Services
and Practical Effect on Differences in Causation Provisions

The fact that OFAC has brought enforcement actions based on a theory of
export of financial services on multiple occasions raises the question of
whether the availability of this enforcement mechanism subsumes any differences between the broad and limited causation language. The Syria and Zimbabwe sanctions programs, which are the only sanctions programs with limited causation provisions appearing as separate prohibitions, do contain
prohibitions against the export of services from the United States or by a U.S.
person to sanctioned parties (and with respect to Syria, against the export of
services to anywhere in Syria).102 Although these two sanctions programs expressly limit the reach of their causation provisions to actions taken within the
United States or to conduct by U.S. parties, OFAC could theoretically bring
an enforcement action where facts exist similar to the TransTel matter, but
based on a theory of export of financial services to parties sanctioned under
the Syrian or Zimbabwean sanctions programs. The practical effect of the difference in causation language, then, would be minimized; the same type of
conduct (the use of U.S. dollars by foreign parties in transactions with OFACsanctioned individuals and entities) could be reached regardless of the absence
of a broad causation provision in the Syrian or Zimbabwean sanctions programs.
A key question, then, is whether OFAC would consider the type of conduct
in TransTel to be equally reachable by way of a theory of export of financial
services. Was the choice of the causation provision as the basis for liability
made because OFAC did not consider a theory of export of financial services
as applicable where the foreign party was not a financial institution? The answer to that question will depend on the nature of future enforcement actions
brought by OFAC and on which theories of liability OFAC chooses to base
those cases. In addition, in the enforcement actions described above that were
brought after the TransTel settlement, OFAC continued to rely on a theory of
export of services to sanctioned entities or countries, rather than basing such
enforcement actions principally on the causation provisions as it had done in
TransTel.103 Therefore, it remains to be seen whether OFAC’s use of the causation provision in TransTel as a basis for enforcement constitutes a new trend
in sanctions enforcement, or whether TransTel will remain an outlier with respect to OFAC’s use of a broad causation provision to reach transactions outside of the United States entered into by non-U.S. parties who are not financial
institutions.
102

Prohibitions to Syria, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207 (2014); Prohibited Transactions to Syria,
31 C.F.R. § 542.201 (2014); Prohibited Transactions to Zimbabwe, 31 C.F.R. § 541.201
(2014).
103
TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3.
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IV. U.S. DOLLAR CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
This Part examines the nature of dollar clearing and settlement as related
to dollar-denominated transactions made both within the United States and
overseas. In doing so, this Article seeks to identify potential U.S. nexuses that
could support OFAC’s use of the causation provisions to reach as far as prohibiting the use of U.S. dollars in the transactions of foreign entities with U.S.sanctioned parties, whether those U.S. dollars are held at U.S. or non-U.S.
financial institutions. Both the limited and the expansive causation provisions
require the involvement of a U.S. party or some action having been taken
within the United States or by a U.S. party, however tangentially, in order for
a foreign party to incur a violation based on causation (although this factor is
necessary, but not sufficient, for a theory of liability using the limited causation provisions).104 Therefore, the identification of those parties who can be
involved in U.S. dollar clearing transactions is helpful to determine under
which circumstances foreign parties may or may not use U.S. dollars for transactions involving blocked or sanctioned parties. This Article concludes in this
Part that U.S. parties do appear to be in fact involved, however tangentially,
in U.S. dollar clearing and settlement processes even when offshore clearing
systems are used in a particular transaction, and thus a broad causation provision or a theory of export of financial services could be used as the basis for
OFAC enforcement with respect to any U.S. dollar-denominated transaction
with a U.S.-sanctioned party.105
As discussed in the previous Part, a theory of export of financial services
might be a tenable theory of liability based on the export of financial services
even if a particular sanctions program at issue contains a limited, rather than
expansive, causation provision. The availability of this alternative theory of
liability therefore narrows the practical effect of the disparity in causation provisions in most U.S. dollar transactions. Identifying which parties may cause
a sanctions violation, however, is important to understanding the extent to
which OFAC may employ broad causation provisions as an enforcement tool
in the future and also to the ways in which the theory of export of financial
services may be used in connection with U.S. dollar-denominated transactions.

104
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 542.205 (2014) (Syria, limited); 31 C.F.R. § 547.205 (Democratic Republic of the Congo, broad).
105
See generally TransTel Settlement Agreement, supra note 3; Lloyds Settlement
Agreement, supra note 50; Credit Suisse AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; BNP
Paribas SA 8 Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; Barclays Settlement Agreement, supra
note 50; UniCredit Bank AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 50; Standard Chartered
Bank Settlement Agreement, supra note 50.
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A. Methods of U.S. Dollar Clearing
The process of “[d]ollar clearing involves the conversion of payments on
behalf of clients into U.S. dollars from a foreign currency.”106 “Clearing” is
“the process of transmitting, reconciling, and in some cases confirming payment orders or security transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly including the netting of instructions and the establishment of final positions for
settlement.”107 There are three main steps in clearing: “processing payment
instruments, delivering them to paying banks, and calculating interbank payment obligations.”108 Settlement is the act that discharges the payment obligations in respect of funds or securities.109
CHIPS (owned by commercial banks and supervised by the U.S. Federal
Reserve) and FedWire (operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve) are the two
major U.S. payment systems, and are described in greater detail below.110 To
dollar clear in the United States, foreign banks do not need have banking operations in the United States, “but whichever bank they use to do so must be
a customer of either the private sector-owned Clearing House Interbank Payment System [CHIPS] or the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire Funds Service [Fedwire].”111
i.

Fedwire

The Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) operates as a real-time gross settlement system and “is generally used to make large-value, time-critical payments.”112 Fedwire is used “to make cash concentration payments, to settle
commercial payments, to settle positions with other financial institutions or
clearing arrangements, to submit federal tax payments or to buy and sell

106

Johnson, supra note 74.
Morten L. Bech et al., Settlement Liquidity and Monetary Policy Implementation—
Lessons From the Financial Crisis, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Mar. 2012, at 1, 2.
108
Bruce J. Summers & R. Alton Gilbert, Clearing and Settlement of U.S. Dollar Payments: Back to the Future?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. Sept./Oct. 1996, at 3, 6.
109
Id.
110
Karen Freifeld et al., Exclusive: BNP Asks Other Banks for Help as Dollar Clearing
Ban Nears, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-pari
bas-clearing/exclusive-bnp-asks-other-banks-for-help-as-dollar-clearing-ban-nears-idUS
KCN0HV28C20141006.
111
Duncan Kerr, Clearing: European Banks Weigh up US Dollar Clearing Options,
EUROMONEY, (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjyygbzp9v4/clearin
g-european-banks-weigh-up-us-dollar-clearing-options.
112
Fedwire Funds Services, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.
federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_about.htm (last updated Feb. 19, 2014).
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federal funds.”113 Fedwire is operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve Banks114
and operates in the following manner:
When sending a payment order to the Fedwire Funds Service,
a Fedwire participant authorizes its Federal Reserve Bank to
debit its master account for the amount of the transfer. If the
payment order is accepted, the Federal Reserve Bank holding
the master account of the Fedwire participant that is to receive
the transfer will credit the same amount to that master account.115
Foreign banks that are Fedwire participants “can send and receive payments directly via Fedwire using the SWIFT international messaging116 service.”117 Foreign banks that are not Fedwire participants “can send payments
via a US bank or another foreign bank that is a Fedwire participant,” using
correspondent banking.118 Correspondent banking, generally, is defined as “an
arrangement under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits owned by
other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other services to those
respondent banks.”119 Correspondent banking “requires the opening of accounts by respondent banks in the correspondent banks’ books and the exchange of messages to settle transactions by crediting and debiting those accounts.”120
In 2018, Fedwire originated approximately 158.4 million transactions valued at approximately $716.2 trillion. 121
113
Fedwire Funds Service, THE FEDERAL RESERVE, https://www.frbservices.org/assets/fi
nancial-services/wires/funds.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
114
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 112.
115
Fedwire Funds Service, supra note 113.
116
SWIFT is “the global provider of secure financial messaging services,” connecting
11,000 institutions over more than 200 countries and territories. About Us, SWIFT,
https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). In 1977, the SWIFT messaging system replaced the Telex technology used by banks to communicate instructions for
cross-border transactions. Discover SWIFT: Messaging and Standards, SWIFT,
https://www.swift.com/about-us/discover-swift/messaging-standards (last visited Oct. 24,
2019).
117
Frances Coppola, Fedwire: The US Dollar in International Payments, AMERICAN
EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/fedwire-us-doll
ar-in-international-payments/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
118
Id.
119
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES,
CORRESPONDENT BANKING (2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf.
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Id.
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Fedwire Funds Service—Annual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https
://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfunds_ann.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2019).
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CHIPS

The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) system transmits and settles U.S. dollar payments among participating banks.122 CHIPS
was organized in 1970 with eight members and gradually expanded thereafter.123 CHIPS is operated by The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C.,
which is based in New York.124 CHIPS processed an average of approximately 361,000 payments per day during 2010, and the total value of transfers
originated during that year was about $365 trillion.125 Unlike the real-time
gross settlement system of Fedwire, CHIPS allows for payments to be netted,
allowing for the consolidation of pending payments into a fewer number of
transactions.126 CHIPS transfers daily amount to approximately 80% of nonsecurities transfers by Fedwire.127 “CHIPS clears and settles approximately
$1.5 trillion in domestic and international payments per day.”128 The CHIPS
system is governed by the law of the state of New York and operates in the
following manner:
A CHIPS participant sends a payment message to CHIPS in a
structured format . . . . The payment message is sent to CHIPS
through one of two communications-networks . . . . Upon receipt of a payment message, CHIPS will perform systems syntax checks rejecting any payment message that does not pass
the checks. Once these syntax checks have been completed,
CHIPS will move the payment message to a queue where a
computer algorithm determines whether to release the message. The payment message will be released if the algorithm
122
BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 471, 488 (2013), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_us.pdf.
123
CHIPS, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Apr. 2002), https://www.newyorkfed.org/about
thefed/fedpoint/fed36.html.
124
CLEARING HOUSE, CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (“CHIPS”)
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL, GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATING
FRAMEWORK 1, 6 (2018), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/p
ayment-systems/chips-public-disclosure-2018.pdf.
125
BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 122, at 3.2.2.3.
126
About CHIPS, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/link.aspx?
_id=8AD2931B0ED0468DB096332DA183241B&_z=z (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
127
CHIPS, supra note 123.
128
About CHIPS, supra note 126; see also Phillip Silitschanu, B2B Payments Lending:
What Are Fedwire Transfers?, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/ar
ticles/fedwire-transfers/#:~:targetText=The%20Fedwire%20transfer%20system%20is,tw
elve%20U.S.%20Federal%20Reserve%20Banks.&targetText=Because%20Fed-wire%tra
nsfers%20do%20not,Bank%20actually%20transfers%20US%245%2C000 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2019).

60

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:29

determines that it can be released and settled within the parameters sent by the CHIPS Rules. 129
Each CHIPS participant must deposit a predetermined amount into a prefunded balance account and may also transfer additional funds into the account.130
Relevant to this Article’s examination of the role of U.S. persons in dollar
clearing, CHIPS participants “must be a U.S. depository institution or a U.S.
branch or agency of a foreign bank, and if a participant uses a leased telecommunications line as its connection to CHIPS, the line must terminate at an
office of the participant located in the United States.”131 Therefore, “for each
CHIPS payment message, both the sender and the receiving bank is a U.S.
bank.”132
iii.

Offshore Clearing Systems

U.S. dollar accounts may also be cleared through offshore dollar clearing
transactions, including through systems based in Singapore, Hong Kong, the
Philippines, and Japan.133 Within Singapore, the U.S. Dollar Cheque Clearing
system “clear[s] and settle[s] U.S. dollar-denominated cheques drawn on
banks in Singapore.”134 CHATS allows for real-time gross settlement of U.S.
dollar payments and payments vs. payment of U.S. vs. Hong Kong dollars.135
For the Singaporean USDCCS, “BCS and Citibank are the appointed clearing operator and settlement bank, respectively . . . .” BSC is the Banking
Computer Services Pte Ltd.136 The USDCCS operates as follows:
(1) USD cheques are delivered to the [Singapore Automated
Clearing House] ACH by presenting banks. (2) At the end of
129
THE CLEARING HOUSE, CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM (“CHIPS”)
SELF-ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT
PAYMENT SYSTEMS 6 (2016), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/files/payco%20fil
es/standards%20self%20assessment%202016.pdf?la=en.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 12.
132
Id.
133
Clif Burns, Touch a U.S. Dollar Anywhere, Go Directly to U.S. Jail, EXPORT L. BLOG
(Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/8621; see also Kerr, supra note
111 (“Tokyo, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila are the only official offshore US dollar
clearing centres”).
134
Payment Systems in Singapore, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS 1, 10 (2003), https://ww
w.bis.org/cpmi/paysys/singaporecomp.pdf.
135
Bech, supra note 107.
136
Payment Systems in Singapore, supra note 134, at 3, 10.
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the first day, the ACH will generate a settlement statement to
the settlement bank setting out the total credits and the total
debits of each of the participating banks. (3) The settlement
bank then advises participating banks if there will be insufficient funds in their accounts with the settlement bank, based
on a comparison of the total debit position against available
funds in each participating bank’s account. Participating banks
are required to meet any projected shortfall. (4) The ACH processes and sorts the USD cheques and these are available for
collection by the relevant paying banks on the second business
day. Settlement occurs on the second business day across participating banks’ accounts with Citibank, but the funds are not
considered “cleared funds” until the end of day three. (5) All
returned unpaid USD cheques are delivered to the ACH at the
latest by the morning of the third business day. (6) The ACH
processes the returned cheques and the relevant presenting
banks collect them by noon on the third business day. (7) The
customers can then withdraw the proceeds after 14:00 on the
third business day. 137
Hong Kong’s USD CHATS began operating on August 21, 2000.138 The
settlement institution of the USD CHATS is The Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation139, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of HSBC and is
headquartered in Hong Kong.140 HSBC itself is headquartered in the United
Kingdom.141 Settlement in the USD CHATS system takes place on the books
of HSBC in New York City.142 The settlement institution has appointed as
system operator Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Limited (HKICL), which is
jointly owned by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Hong Kong
Association of Banks (HKAB), which is the association of the licensed banks
137

Id. at 10-11.
H.K. MONETARY AUTH., ASSESSMENT OF US DOLLAR CHATS AGAINST THE
PRINCIPLES FOR FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 1, 4 (2016), https://www.hkma.gov
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df.
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BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN
HONG KONG SAR 1, 10 (2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_hk.pdf.
140
HSBC, HSBC BANK (CHINA) COMPANY LIMITED FACT SHEET (2009), https://www.hs
bc.com.cn/1/PA_ES_Content_Mgmt/content/china/about/docs/factsheetenJan09.pdf.
141
Id.
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Morten L. Bech et al., Global Trends in Large-Value Payments, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y
REV. 59, 66 (Sept. 2008), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/0
8v14n2/0809prei.pdf. “Direct participants can enjoy an interest-free overdraft facility and
interest-free intraday repos if they can repay HSBC’s New York correspondent before the
close of the New York CHIPS on that value day.” BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT
SYSTEMS IN HONG KONG 1, 197 (2003), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d53p07 hk.pdf.
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in Hong Kong.143 “Participants must connect to the SWIFT network in order
to access USD CHATS to initiate or receive payment instructions.”144 USD
CHATS is governed by the laws of Hong Kong.145 In 2015, USD CHATS
settled transactions daily averaging $25 billion. 146
As part of the USD CHATS validation process, “[a]ll validated transactions will be sent to a sanction screening system for scanning” before settlement occurs.147 A 2016 update from Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Limited
states that “USD CHATS has been enhanced to interface with the HSBC Sanction screening system, replacing the Centralised Payment Filter, with effect
from 1 August 2016 to provide corresponding payment sanction screening capabilities.”148
The Philippine Domestic Dollar Transfer System (PDDTS) is used for the
transfer of U.S. dollars across banks in the Philippines.149 Citi Philippines is
the settlement bank for PDDTS, which position it has held since 1994.150 Citi
Philippines is a branch of Citibank, and thus would be considered a U.S. person under the sanctions regulations.151 Within Japan, JP Morgan Chase & Co.
(a U.S. entity) has operated Japan’s Tokyo Dollar Clearing system since its
establishment in 1986.152
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H.K. MONETARY AUTH., supra note 138, at 4-5.
Id. at 6.
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Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures: Disclosure for USD CHATS, HSBC
GRP. MGMT. SERV. LTD., https://www.hsbcnet.com/-/media/hsbcnet/attachments/productsservices/transaction-banking/payments-cash-management/principles-for-financial-market
-infrastructures.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
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What’s New, H.K. INTERBANK CLEARING LIMITED (June 10, 2019), http://www.hkicl.c
om.hk/clientbrowse.do?docID=2&lang=en.
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PAYMENTS & SETTLEMENT OFFICE, THE PHILIPPINE PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM (2019), http://www.bsp.gov.ph/payments/payments/PhilPaSS.pdf.
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MANILA BULL. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://business.mb.com.ph/2017/10/18/citi-ph-celebratesreappointment-as-domestic-settlement-bank-for-us-dollars/; CITI TRANSACTION SERV.,
PHILIPPINES: COUNTRY PROFILE (2012), https://www.citibank.com/tts/insights/eSource_ac
ademy/docs/country_profiles/asia_pacific/1442004516-Citi-TTS-Philippines-Country-Pr
ofile-Sep2015.pdf.
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B. Does Using U.S. Dollars Necessarily “Cause a Violation” of the
Sanctions Regulations Through Dollar Clearing?
Apart from the issue of differences in language and the extraterritorial application of the statute, there is the question of whether, where there is broad
regulatory causation language in place, the use of U.S. dollars in transactions
by foreign parties with U.S.-sanctioned parties would necessarily cause a
sanctions violation. Additionally, there is a question of what conduct OFAC
could regulate based on the theory of direct or indirect export of financial services to a sanctioned party. The answer to this question will have implications
for general compliance: should parties, U.S. and non-U.S., consider there to
be a blanket restriction on the use of U.S. dollars in such transactions? The
answer will also affect OFAC enforcement actions: will OFAC necessarily
need to show a U.S. nexus in each enforcement action? Or will the presence
of U.S. dollars be sufficient to assume the causation of a sanctions violation?
This analysis therefore involves identifying the involvement of parties subject
to the U.S. sanctions regulations when U.S. dollars are used in a transaction,
and how their involvement in a U.S. dollar-denominated transaction might
violate OFAC regulations.
i.

U.S. Dollar Clearing Systems

As described above, the CHIPS and Fedwire systems will necessarily involve a U.S. party at some point in a dollar clearing transaction. During the
course of a payment completed using the Fedwire system, the Federal Reserve
Bank involved completes the necessary debit and credit of the relevant Fedwire participant. The CHIPS system itself, owned and operated by a U.S. company, would also be a “U.S. person” under the OFAC regulations. Moreover,
within the CHIPS system, both the sender and the receiving bank are U.S
banks, which necessarily involves a U.S. person in the course of a CHIPS
transaction.
Therefore, the use of the CHIPS or Fedwire systems could be considered
to cause a sanctions violation if a U.S. dollar-denominated transaction was
processed involving a U.S.-sanctioned party, due to the necessary involvement of U.S. entities in the dollar clearing process. The extremely large volume of transactions processed by the CHIPS and Fedwire systems together
will therefore give great effect and wide reach to the broad causation provisions when applied to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions.
ii.

Offshore Dollar Clearing Systems

U.S. dollar-denominated transactions made between foreign parties and
effected through offshore clearing centers have, on their face, a less clear
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jurisdictional nexus to the OFAC regulations than do the U.S. dollar-denominated transactions transacted through U.S. payment systems. However, as described above, since the settlement banks used in offshore dollar clearing systems, such as in the Singaporean dollar clearing system or the Hong Kong
USD CHATS system, are U.S. entities, it seems that the involvement of a U.S.
settlement bank could be considered a U.S. party necessarily involved in a
transaction where dollar clearing and settlement occurs. Thus, a U.S. dollardenominated transaction involving a U.S. settlement bank would be considered to cause the U.S. settlement bank to violate the sanctions regulations and
thus form the basis for liability under a broad causation provision. Indeed, it
seems that such might have been the jurisdictional nexus for OFAC to bring
the TransTel action, as that matter involved a non-U.S. party acting outside of
the U.S. with dollar transactions effected in Singapore.153
Based on this logic, it appears that the involvement of a U.S. settlement
bank would form a sufficient basis for the application of U.S. dollar sanctions
in the context of transactions effected by means of offshore dollar clearing
systems when the broad causation provisions or a theory of export of financial
services are used. By the plain language of the regulations, OFAC in most
cases would be authorized to take action against parties using U.S. dollars in
transactions with sanctioned entities.154 This is, however, separate from the
question of whether the sanctions programs were intended to wield such wide153

It has been argued that the presence of a settlement bank is not in itself sufficient to
constitute the export of a financial service from the United States in the context of an offshore dollar clearing system.
Say a bank in Singapore pays $10,000 for a customer’s Iran transaction but during the
day pays out $200,000 and receives $100,000 where none of these other dollar transactions
have anything to do with Iran. It will need to transfer $100,000 to the Singapore clearing
house, which will be effectuated through a U.S. Dollar correspondent account in the United
States. In that case the bank in the United States has not transferred any financial services
to Iran because the payment relates to an aggregate of transactions valued at $300,000,
almost all of which have nothing to do with Iran. The only scenario in the Singapore clearing situation where the U.S. bank would transfer a financial service to Iran would be where
the Iran payment by the Singapore bank is the only U.S. dollar transaction by the Singapore
bank during the clearing day. Burns, supra note 133.
However, based on the existence of the TransTel settlement, it seems that OFAC considers the general presence of a U.S. settlement bank in a dollar clearing system to be sufficient to support U.S. jurisdiction. The broad language of the OFAC prohibitions in general might form the basis for a potential argument by OFAC that the nature of causing a
violation would depend not on the direct transfer of financial services to a sanctioned party
or country by virtue of a direct dollar transfer in connection with a particular transaction,
but perhaps indirectly where the sanctioned party is able to take advantage of a U.S. dollar
payment system that would not be able to function without the general involvement of the
U.S. financial institution as the settlement bank.
154
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 542.201 (Syrian sanctions regulation prohibiting dealings in
property and interests in property in the possession or control of U.S. persons of blocked
parties and the Government of Syria).
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ranging authority, or whether the extraterritorial reach of these sanctions
should be limited by other principles.
Consistent with the conclusion that the use of the U.S. dollar is enough to
involve the actions of U.S. entities, even where those dollars are not held at
U.S. financial institutions, the case of U.S. v. Zarrab upheld the authority of
OFAC to reach transactions based on the use of U.S. dollars alone (though
that case examined a theory of liability based on an export of financial services, rather than based on a broad causation provision).155 In Zarrab, the defendant was charged in part with conspiracy to violate the IEEPA and the
ITSR, among other counts, by allegedly “conducting international financial
transactions using Turkish and Emirati companies on behalf of and for the
benefit of Iranian individuals and entities in order to conceal from U.S. banks
and others that services were being provided” to sanctioned parties and to
Iran.156 In his motion to dismiss the indictment, the defendant argued that 31
C.F.R. § 560.204, which prohibits exports, directly or indirectly, from the
United States or by a U.S. person, did not apply to his conduct because “[t]he
funds [the defendant] and his alleged co-conspirators sent to third countries,
purportedly for the benefit of Iran, all came ‘from’ accounts held outside of
the U.S. by foreign persons at foreign banks.”157 He argued that a U.S. nexus
had not been created by “the mere fact that a U.S. bank cleared a payment
originating and terminating at foreign banks . . . .”158 The court, however, disagreed with the defendant’s interpretation of the ITSR. It noted that the Second Circuit “has made clear that ‘the execution of money transfers on behalf
of others from the United States to Iran’ may constitute the exportation or
supply of a prohibited ‘service,’ in violation of the IEEPA and the ITSR.”159
The court found that the indictment alleged a U.S. nexus: namely, the exportation of services from the U.S. in the form of financial services.160
Based on the previous analysis of the offshore dollar clearing systems, the
use of the U.S. dollar is enough to trigger a U.S. nexus sufficient to support
the application of U.S. sanctions regulations, whether the transaction is effected through a U.S. or offshore dollar clearing system. Consistently, the
Zarrab case found that the use of U.S. dollars constituted the rendering of a
financial service, even when those dollars were held abroad.161 Based on these
facts and on the OFAC enforcement history detailed earlier in this Article,
OFAC will likely seek to continue to apply U.S. sanctions provisions to
155

Zarrab, 2016 WL 6820737, at *11.
Id. at *7 n.11.
157
Id. at *5 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Reza Zarrab’s Motion
to Dismiss, United States v. Zarrab, No. S1 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 10998479, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2016) [hereinafter Zarrab Motion to Dismiss]).
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Id. at *5 (citing Zarrab Motion to Dismiss, 2016 WL 10998479, at *12).
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Id. at *7 (quoting United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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Id. at *8.
161
Id. at *35.
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transactions involving the U.S. dollar and undertaken with U.S.-sanctioned
parties, whether by employing the broad causation provisions or a theory of
liability based on the export of financial services from the United States.
V. CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO DIFFERING CAUSATION PROVISIONS
This Part will discuss some of the issues that arise in the context of certain
sanctions programs with different causation language. It will also examine the
general manner in which OFAC makes known and clarifies the sanctions compliance obligations connected with the use of the U.S. dollar arising as a result
of the broad causation provisions and the general prohibitions on the export
of services. This Article recommends that the prohibitions around the use of
the U.S. dollar, especially by foreign parties and through offshore dollar clearing systems, be highlighted more clearly and consistently within OFAC publications, web notices, and responses to frequently asked questions, in order
to ensure that the requirements around the use of the U.S. dollar are more
broadly and accurately understood and to promote compliance with those requirements.
A. Notice
i.

OFAC Publications

Whether a blanket prohibition applied to block U.S. dollar transactions
with a sanctioned party (even when such a transaction is carried out by a nonU.S. person) is not always readily apparent upon either a reading of the plain
text of the sanctions laws and regulations or a review of informational material
put forth by OFAC. More recently, however, OFAC has provided additional
guidance regarding the obligations of non-U.S. parties under the OFAC regulations with respect to their use of U.S. dollars,162 which suggests that the use
of U.S. dollars can often trigger a sanctions violation, even for non-U.S. entities conducting transactions outside of the United States. Even so, OFAC has
not yet publicly addressed the issue of whether differing causation language
across U.S. sanctions programs might affect any prohibitions against U.S. dollar use with sanctioned parties, or whether any such dealings would be considered an indirect export of financial services and thus the differing causation
language would have no practical effect on the obligations of foreign parties
with respect to U.S. dollars.
In May 2019, OFAC issued a Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments providing information on how entities could use a risk-based approach
162

See discussion infra p. 67-68.
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to sanctions compliance, based on at least management commitment, risk assessment, internal controls, testing and auditing, and training.163 Within that
document, OFAC provided a list of root causes of OFAC sanctions compliance program breakdowns or deficiencies, based on its assessment of prior
OFAC administrative actions.164 One such deficiency listed was “Utilizing the
U.S. Financial System, or Processing Payments to or through U.S. Financial
Institutions, for Commercial Transactions Involving OFAC-Sanctioned Persons or Countries.”165 That root cause was explained by OFAC as follows:
Many non-U.S. persons have engaged in violations of OFAC’s
regulations by processing financial transactions (almost all of
which have been denominated in U.S. Dollars) to or through
U.S. financial institutions that pertain to commercial activity
involving an OFAC-sanctioned country, region, or person.
Although no organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction may be
involved in the underlying transaction–such as the shipment of
goods from a third-country to an OFAC-sanctioned country–
the inclusion of a U.S. financial institution in any payments
associated with these transactions often results in a prohibited
activity (e.g., the exportation or re-exportation of services
from the United States to a comprehensively sanctioned country, or dealing in blocked property in the United States).166
The Compliance Framework therefore explained that the use of U.S. dollars may “often” result in a prohibited activity such as the export of services
to a sanctioned country, but the Framework did not reach the issue of whether
a blanket prohibition is in place against the use of U.S. dollars in transactions
with sanctioned entities, both for U.S. and foreign parties. This language is
helpful for alerting entities to review their use of U.S. dollars in regard to U.S.
sanctions compliance, including the examples of comprehensively sanctioned
countries or dealing in blocked property, but does not entirely clarify when
the use of U.S. dollars does or does not implicate the U.S. sanctions regulations.
Before the Framework was issued, other OFAC documents referenced the
nexus between U.S. dollars and U.S. sanctions more obliquely. For example,
on January 16, 2016, OFAC issued responses to FAQs relating to the lifting
163
OFAC Issues a Framework for Compliance Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY (May 2, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm680; A
Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://w
ww.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/framework_ofac_cc.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
164
See Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, supra note 163.
165
Id.
166
Id.
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of certain U.S. sanctions under the JCPOA on Implementation Day.167 The
response to question C. 7. indicated that foreign financial institutions, “including foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. financial institutions,” could
process U.S. dollar-denominated transactions or maintain U.S. dollar-denominated accounts involving Iran or persons ordinarily resident in Iran, or of persons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13599 and section 560.211 of the ITSR,
so long as such transactions did not involve any SDN and if such activities
“d[id] not involve, directly or indirectly, the United States financial system or
any United States person.”168 The response further noted that foreign financial
institutions needed to ensure that such transactions were not processed
through the U.S. financial system or otherwise involved U.S. financial institutions (including foreign branches), in order to comply with the continued
prohibition on U.S. persons exporting financial services directly or indirectly
to Iran (including in currencies other than the U.S. dollar).169 Similarly, the
response to question C. 8. indicated that non-U.S. persons were now permitted
to provide U.S. bank notes to the Government of Iran, so long as the activity
did not involve an SDN or prohibited conduct.170 Such transactions were prohibited from transiting the U.S. financial system.171 This language, by referencing currencies other than the U.S. dollar, and the need to avoid the U.S.
financial system, hinted that the U.S. dollar cannot be used in any transaction
prohibited by the Iranian sanctions regulation, but that prohibition was not
stated outright.
Beyond the Compliance Framework, the OFAC FAQs in place on the
OFAC website also do not directly address the issue when the use of the U.S.
dollar may involve the application of U.S. sanctions. Currently, OFAC FAQ
11 responds to the question: “Who must comply with OFAC regulations?”
U.S. persons must comply with OFAC regulations, including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all
persons and entities within the United States, all U.S. incorporated entities and
their foreign branches. In the case of certain programs, foreign subsidiaries
owned or controlled by U.S. companies must comply. Certain programs also
require foreign persons in possession of U.S.-origin goods to comply. 172
167

JCPOA Implementation, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.tr
easury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/jcpoa_implementation.as
px.
168
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents
/jcpoa_faqs.pdf (last updated Dec. 15, 2016).
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OFAC FAQs: General Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury
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While the response mentions the responsibilities of non-U.S. persons in
possession of U.S. goods to comply, there is nothing in the FAQ response to
indicate a similar responsibility of a foreign person in possession of U.S. dollars. This FAQ could be amended to indicate the presence of obligations with
respect to U.S. dollars. Likewise, it was unclear in previous FAQs relating to
the ITSR whether all U.S. dollar transactions were prohibited.173
Before the TransTel settlement and the issuance of the Compliance Framework, it was unclear whether OFAC would consider the use of the U.S. dollar,
even in offshore clearing systems, to be prohibited in connection with transactions with sanctioned parties, based on the expansive causation provisions.
For example, S.2752 proposed prohibiting the President from issuing any license under IEEPA that would permit anyone “to conduct an offshore United
States dollar clearing system for transactions involving the Government of
Iran or an Iranian person,” or “to provide United States dollars for any offshore United States dollar clearing system conducted or overseen by a foreign
government or a foreign financial institution for transactions involving the
Government of Iran or an Iranian person.” 174 This bill assumed that a license
was necessary for these actions to be undertaken, which is consistent with the
position taken by OFAC in the TransTel settlement (namely, that the use of
U.S. dollars with a blocked party in Singapore, with its offshore dollar clearing system, was prohibited). It was unclear, however, that such actions would
in fact require a license; the role of the U.S. dollar in connection with U.S.
sanctions was itself not entirely clear.175
OFAC, then, has an opportunity to use its informational materials to provide general guidance on how the use of the U.S. dollar might trigger U.S.
sanctions, such that U.S. and non-U.S. parties might have clearer expectations
around their U.S. sanctions compliance obligations.
ii.

Notice Issues Concerning Definition of “U.S. Person”

The limited causation provisions may seem to have the advantage of clarity
in penalizing only actions taken within the U.S. or by a U.S. person that cause
a violation of the U.S. sanctions. Certain notice issues, however, do also exist
.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_general.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
173
Tyler Cullis, Unresolved Questions on Offshore Dollar-Clearing, SANCTIONLAW
BLOG (Apr. 15, 2016), https://sanctionlaw.com/unresolved-questions-on-offshore-dollar-c
learing/.
174
Preventing Iran’s Access to United States Dollars Act of 2016, S. 2752, 114th Cong.
(2016).
175
See, e.g., Tyler Cullis, Memo: Senators Kirk and Rubio Bill on Dollar Clearing Would
Violate Iran Deal, NIAC ACTION (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.niacaction.org/memo-senat
ors-kirk-and-rubio-bill-on-dollar-clearing-would-violate-iran-deal/ (stating that “foreign
banks are likely not barred from clearing U.S. dollar-denominated transactions involving
Iran if such dollar clearing does not touch the United States.”).
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in the context of the limited causation provision. Namely, parties seeking to
comply with the limited causation provision must contend with the issue of
how well-defined a “U.S. person” is or what actions “within the U.S.” constitute in connection with the limited causation language.
For example, the issue of the definition of a “U.S. person” under the meaning of the sanctions regulations arose in 2017, when OFAC issued a finding
of violation to B Whale Corporation (BWC).176 BWC was based in Taipei,
Taiwan and had entered into a bankruptcy proceeding in a U.S. bankruptcy
court. OFAC “determined that BWC was a U.S. person within the scope of
the ITSR because it was present in the United States for the bankruptcy proceedings when the transaction occurred.”177 Moreover, the vessel was found
to be subject to U.S. sanctions regulations “because it was property under the
jurisdiction of a U.S. bankruptcy court.”178
BWC itself filed the bankruptcy petition at issue, thereby voluntarily making itself subject to the U.S. judicial system.179 What if BWC had appeared as
a defendant or otherwise involuntarily in a U.S. court case? The BWC case,
therefore, raises questions regarding the expansiveness of the definition of a
“U.S. person” as defined by the U.S. sanctions regulations,180 and thus the
effectiveness of limited causation principles in helping a foreign party to understand and comply with its U.S. sanctions obligations. Where the meaning
of a “U.S. person” is interpreted broadly, parties located outside of the United
States might not be aware or might have difficulty in determining whether
they would be considered U.S. persons under the meaning of the OFAC regulations, especially where the theory of export of financial services is also in
place.
iii.

The 50% Rule

Restrictions on the use of the U.S. dollar by non-U.S. parties might be particularly difficult for the compliance efforts of those parties in light of the
existence of OFAC’s 50% Rule, whereby parties may be subject to U.S.
176

OFAC Issues a Finding of Violation to B Whale Corporation, a Member of the TMT
Group of Shipping Companies, for a Violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanc
tions/CivPen/Documents/20170203_bwc.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
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Debtor’s Emergency Motion for an Order (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Use Cash
Collateral of Existing Secured Lenders, (II) Granting Adequate Protection for Use Thereof,
(III) Scheduling Final Hearing at 1, 3, In re TMT USA Shipmanagement LLC, No. 1333740 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 20, 2013).
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Clif Burns, OFAC Radically Expands Its Extraterritorial Jurisdiction with B Whale
Ruling, EXPORT LAW BLOG (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/8298.
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sanctions even if they are not explicitly designated, by reason of their corporate ownership. Foreign entities seeking to use the U.S. dollar must therefore
inquire into the corporate ownership of potential transaction parties, in addition to screening such parties to determine if they have been specifically
named to U.S. government lists.
OFAC originally issued its 50% Rule on February 14, 2008 and issued
revised guidance on August 13, 2014 concerning this policy.181 As referenced
earlier in this Article, pursuant to the 50% Rule, entities are blocked when
they are owned in a 50% or greater interest by blocked persons, individually
or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly.182 As such, “a U.S. person generally
may not engage in any transactions with such an entity, unless authorized by
OFAC.”183 Moreover, “[a] property interest subject to blocking includes interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”184 The revised guidance
advised U.S. persons “to act with caution when considering a transaction with
a non-blocked entity in which one or more persons has a significant ownership
interest that is less than 50 percent or which one or more persons may control
by means other than a majority ownership interest,”185 since such entities
could be the subject of future OFAC designations or enforcement actions.
The 50% Rule thereby raises certain issues for foreign entities seeking to
ensure corporate compliance. Identifying those parties with whom U.S. dollars cannot be used becomes more challenging when going beyond specifically named parties or governments and considering issues of corporate ownership, especially where such ownership information may not be publicly
available. Non-U.S. parties have the obligation, then, to inquire into the ownership of parties to any U.S. dollar transaction. This was demonstrated by the
OFAC settlement in connection with Barclays Zimbabwe in which, as described above, Barclays settled for apparent violations involving corporate
customers of Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Limited that were owned 50 percent or more by an entity on OFAC’s SDN List and which held U.S. dollardenominated accounts.186
Further, as a settlement between OFAC and Cobham Holdings, Inc.
demonstrates, effective screening of transaction parties may be impeded due
to screening software failures, making it more difficult for companies to
181

OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.trea
sury.gov/resource-center/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_compliance.aspx (last visited Oct. 19,
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effectively ascertain their compliance responsibilities and identify potentially
problematic transaction partners when using U.S. dollars.187 In the Cobham
settlement, Metelics (a subsidiary of Cobham at the time) apparently violated
the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations by selling items to a blocked person through distributors in Canada and Russia.188 The purchaser, although not
specifically identified on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons (the SDN List), was 51% owned by an SDN, and as such
was blocked by way of the 50% Rule.189 Metelics performed denied party
screenings, but the third-party screening software used did not produce any
warnings or alerts for the purchaser.190 This was due to a failure of the software to identify matches to the SDN List containing additional words in the
inputted language.191 As this case demonstrates, parties can be the subject of
OFAC enforcement actions even where they have taken steps to screen their
transaction parties and attempted to comply with OFAC regulations, and compliance can be complicated by the existence of OFAC’s 50% Rule.
iv.

Notice and Effect on Compliance Efforts

Non-U.S. individuals and entities do not face a clearly-defined set of rules
when trying to determine what activities they may perform with U.S. dollars;
even though an effective prohibition against the use of U.S. dollars in transactions with sanctioned entities may be in place, that prohibition is not readily
apparent from a textual reading of the U.S. sanctions regulations. The use of
the causation provisions as a basis for liability further muddies these expectations, as the causation provisions appear in two different forms across sanctions programs. These requirements around the use of U.S. dollars are not
well-publicized by OFAC, and the vague language of “causing a violation”
can easily fail to convey the basic directive that U.S. dollars cannot be used in
transactions with sanctioned entities and may also obscure the fact that there
could be an alternative basis for liability based on the export of financial services from the United States. This vagueness is especially worrisome where
violation of these laws may involve criminal as well as civil penalties, as previously discussed.
Compliance is especially difficult where any transaction, no matter how
small, may trigger a sanctions violation, since OFAC does not have a
187
Enforcement Information for November 27, 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20181
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188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.

2019]

CAUSING A SANCTIONS VIOLATION WITH U.S. DOLLARS

73

minimum value threshold on transactions that constitute a sanctions violation.192 Companies may lack visibility as to which companies are considered
sanctioned entities in light of OFAC’s 50% Rule and in the absence of public
ownership information. The broad causation principles and the TransTel enforcement stance create the requirement that non-U.S. parties screen all parties to a transaction involving U.S. dollars.
OFAC has provided some guidance on its enforcement stance with respect
to violations arising as a result of utilizing the U.S. financial system. While
the information provides some reassurance that OFAC mainly focuses its
compliance efforts on willful, reckless, or fraudulent behavior in connection
with the use of the U.S. financial system, that information does not insulate
non-U.S. business entities from potential enforcement actions should they
cause violations of the sanctions programs without the presence of such actions. Namely, OFAC stated the following within its listing of Root Causes of
compliance program deficiencies and breakdowns:
OFAC has generally focused its enforcement investigations on
persons who have engaged in willful or reckless conduct, attempted to conceal their activity (e.g., by stripping or manipulating payment messages, or making false representations to
their non-U.S. or U.S. financial institution), engaged in a pattern or practice of conduct for several months or years, ignored
or failed to consider numerous warning signs that the conduct
was prohibited, involved actual knowledge or involvement by
the organization’s management, caused significant harm to
U.S. sanctions program objectives, and were large or sophisticated organizations. 193
These enforcement factors, however, offer little in the way of bright-line
rules to help entities understand the prohibitions in place against the use of
U.S. dollars with respect to the U.S. sanctions regulations and thereby implement an effective sanctions compliance program. These factors largely presuppose knowledge of the prohibitions involving U.S. dollars in their contemplation of parties who act willfully or recklessly and do not address the issue
of entities who might not fully understand the scope of their compliance obligations with respect to U.S. dollars.
A lack of clear and public information around how U.S. sanctions regulations apply to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions might also cause a
chilling effect on transactions that are legal but involve the use of U.S. dollars
in areas where a relatively larger number of sanctioned parties reside. For
192
OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, supra note 181 (#44: “There is no minimum or
maximum amount subject to the regulations”).
193
Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, supra note 163.
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example, U.S. and European banks have scaled back relationships with banks
in the Persian Gulf region due to sanctions concerns. 194 This trend would
likely be exacerbated if OFAC brings other enforcement actions in the same
vein as TransTel, namely, against non-U.S. entities who are not financial institutions, where the only nexus is the use of U.S. dollars, and where those
enforcement actions are based on an expansive causation provision. If OFAC
does not widely disseminate further information about the nature of U.S. sanctions as applied to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions, this confusion will
likely persist.
v.

Criminal Charges Based on Causation and Export of Financial
Services

Defining what types of conduct might be prohibited by the causation provisions (along with the export of services to sanctioned parties) and considering the sufficiency of OFAC’s notice regarding the prohibition of such conduct are particularly important in light of the fact that criminal penalties are
available for certain violations of the OFAC regulations. Paragraph (c) of 50
U.S.C. § 1705 allows for a fine or imprisonment for any person who willfully
commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids and abets in the
commission of, an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of the Penalties
section.195 Paragraph (a) includes, among other unlawful acts, the causation
of a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under
IEEPA.196 Criminal penalties are possible for those who willfully commit acts
that cause a sanctions violation.197 Such a possibility is problematic where the
issue of what may cause a violation is expansively defined and the type of
conduct prohibited is often unclear from the text of the regulatory language.
Courts have found that various IEEPA prohibitions are not, in fact, unconstitutionally vague.198 While a challenge to the causation provisions on vagueness grounds might be unsuccessful given such precedent, an argument nonetheless persists that OFAC should make as clear as possible any prohibitions
in place that could involve criminal charges if violated.
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While OFAC has recently done more to clarify the obligations of parties
in connection with their use of the U.S. dollar, the reach and expansiveness of
the causation provisions in contexts outside of the United States are far from
clear.
B. Considerations of Extraterritorial Application
Beyond the issue of whether the express language of the causation regulations permits the application of sanctions regulations to conduct outside the
United States or by non-U.S. persons is the question of whether the regulations and the IEEPA statute in general can be applied extraterritorially to reach
such conduct. While this Article focuses primarily on the differences in the
regulatory language itself, rather than on the greater issue of extraterritorial
application, this question is relevant because it raises the issue of whether the
expansive regulatory language would have been understood to reach only conduct by U.S. persons or within the United States due to a generally accepted
principle that the statute not be extended extraterritorially.
The case of U.S. v. Hoskins does not seem to limit the application of these
causing provisions and IEEPA where the only U.S. nexus is the use of U.S.
dollars, even though that case limited extraterritorial conduct prohibited by
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).199 In Hoskins, the Second Circuit
considered the extraterritorial application of the FCPA to the conduct of a
foreign national who “never set foot in the United States or worked for an
American company during the alleged scheme,” on the theory that he was an
accomplice or co-conspirator for an FCPA, for a crime that he was “incapable
of committing as a principal.”200 With respect to the FCPA, the Second Circuit
noted that “Congress had demonstrated an affirmative legislative policy in the
FCPA to limit criminal liability to the enumerated categories of defendants.”201 The court described the two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues set forth by the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco: first, whether
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted, and if not,
whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, by examining
the statute’s “focus.”202
Despite the Second Circuit’s determination that Congress had expressly
intended the FCPA to be applied only within the United States, no such express intent by Congress was demonstrated with respect to IEEPA, and the
IEEPA statute is likely to be allowed to be applied extraterritorially. As discussed above, the court in Zarrab did not decide the defendant’s motion to
dismiss the indictment on the grounds of extraterritorial application, since it
199
200
201
202
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found that the indictment had alleged a U.S. nexus.203 However, the court
noted that “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the issue of extraterritoriality were to
be reached,” such arguments against the extraterritorial application of IEEPA
and the ITSR “would likely prove to be unpersuasive.”204 Indeed, the court
found that “[s]everal provisions of the IEEPA and the ITSR would (expressly)
support the Court’s jurisdiction and any presumption against extraterritoriality
would be overcome by the United States’ interest in defending itself.”205
Moreover, the issue of whether the IEEPA statute can be applied extraterritorially is unlikely to become an issue in the dollar-clearing context, because
“[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply where the failure
to extend the scope of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse
effects within the United States or where the conduct regulated by the government occurs within the United States.”206 Consistent with OFAC’s position in
the TransTel settlement, dollar clearing will be assumed to involve actions
and parties within the U.S. As discussed above, even offshore dollar clearing
systems appear to trigger at least some tangential connection to actions taken
by U.S. entities or within the United States.
C. Potential Effects on the Use of the U.S. Dollar
OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions as an enforcement tool,
along with the theory of export of financial services, means that sanctions
policy will effectively follow the U.S. dollar outside of U.S. borders. Thus,
U.S. sanctions policy can have a broad reach and affect a huge volume of
international transactions. “The strength of American sanctions, after all,
comes from the centrality of the United States financial system in the global
economy, and the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant reserve currency.”207
U.S. dollars are widely held abroad; U.S. dollar liabilities of non-U.S.
banks totaled $12.8 trillion at the end of June 2018.208 As of the first quarter
of 2019, the dollar constituted almost 62% of all known central bank foreign
exchange reserves.209 Nations using the U.S. dollar as their official currency
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include Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador, East Timor, and Zimbabwe.210 The
U.S. dollar is the most dominant vehicle currency211, as it was on one side of
88% of all trades in April 2016.212
OFAC’s far-reaching enforcement stance with respect to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions, however, might possibly discourage foreign parties
from using the U.S. dollar to avoid the application of U.S. sanctions. Indeed,
it has been suggested that “[e]xceedingly punitive penalties may foster the
development of payment systems that avoid the US dollar or the United
States.”213 Moreover, foreign banks may become more reluctant to become
involved in transactions touching the U.S. dollar due to the sanctions implications of such activity. For example, the European Union has created the
INSTEX payment system for use in trade with Iran, avoiding cash payments
by banks by way of a virtual ledger, in order to avoid the application of U.S.
sanctions with respect to Iran.214 The extended reach of U.S. sanctions could
be a factor in making the U.S. dollar less attractive as a currency in which to
complete international business transactions.
The application of U.S. sanctions might be one factor, but not a determinative factor, in causing non-U.S. entities to choose to make their global business transactions in a currency other than the U.S dollar. Indeed, “[b]ecause
of increasingly tightening regulatory requirements (AML [anti-money laundering] and CTF [combatting terrorism financing] as well as regulatory sanctions requirements . . .) by key jurisdictions, such as the US and Europe, seventy-five per cent of global bank providers in this space have reduced their
correspondent banking relationships . . . or withdrawn from this business altogether.”215 The issue of regulatory burden as a whole, rather than the particular application of U.S. sanctions, might diminish the use of U.S. dollars globally. The breadth and depth of the U.S. sanctions regulations, however, does
certainly pose a unique burden to compliance at the present time. “The use of
210
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sanctions has exploded in the 21st century”; as of May 2019, the United States
had “7,967 sanctions in place.”216 OFAC’s application of U.S. sanctions regulations to certain transactions made outside of the United States and by nonU.S. parties through the broad causation provisions and the export of financial
services prohibitions therefore necessarily entails the application of a large
number of regulatory rules and prohibitions.
Despite the potential regulatory burden posed by requiring foreign parties
to comply with U.S. sanctions regulations in connection with all transactions
involving U.S. dollars, it does not currently appear likely that another currency will soon become the global reserve currency. “[W]hile the euro accounted for the second-largest share of global central bank reserves by mid2018, its share was only around one-third that of the dollar,” and likewise,
“[t]he renminbi accounted for . . . 1.84 per cent of global central bank reserves
in mid-2018.”217 Indeed, as the enforcement actions described above demonstrate, OFAC’s reach to transactions and parties largely outside of the United
States but involving the U.S. dollar is not new, and yet the U.S. dollar continues to be widely used abroad. Given the present advantages and universality
of the U.S. dollar, OFAC can most likely effectively attach its sanctions policy
to the U.S. dollar without risking the wholesale abandonment of the U.S. dollar by foreign entities in order to avoid U.S. sanctions.
D. Cash
A related issue is whether it would be possible for the broad causation
provisions (or alternatively, the prohibition against the export of financial services to sanctioned entities) to be interpreted to prohibit the use of U.S. dollars
in the form of cash in transactions with sanctioned entities. If the sanctions
obligations associated with U.S. dollars also applied to the use of the U.S.
dollar in cash, such an enforcement policy would further extend the reach of
U.S. sanctions to a large amount of funds. Namely, it was estimated as of yearend 2010 that the value of U.S. notes and coins in circulation was $983 billion
($942 billion in notes), of which as much as two-third was estimated to be
held abroad.218 Around 2007, it was estimated that close to $500 billion, or
nearly 60% of all U.S. banknotes in circulation, were held outside of the

216

Gilsinan, supra note 207.
Megan Greene, The Dollar Can Defend Its Global Reserve Role Against EU and
China, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5054627c-e1b5-11e8-a8a099b2e340ffeb.
218
Coppola, supra note 117.
217

2019]

CAUSING A SANCTIONS VIOLATION WITH U.S. DOLLARS

79

United States.219 Currently, around $580 billion in U.S. currency is estimated
to be used outside of the United States.220
The OFAC prohibitions at issue are the same whether applied to cash or
other types of transactions, but without dollar clearing, the direct causation
issues involved in non-cash transactions would presumably disappear, as a
U.S. financial institution need not be directly involved in the dollar clearing
and settlement process. In the context of cash transactions, the export of financial services to sanctioned parties or countries would become even more
attenuated. Bringing an enforcement action against cash transactions would
also be more difficult than against non-cash transactions due to the detection
and traceability issues inherent in the use of cash.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
A. Policy Goals Related to Restricting the Use of U.S. Dollars in
Transactions with Sanctioned Parties
Making the causation provisions consistent would be a useful way to make
the causation provisions clearer and more coherent and to bring the text of the
Syrian and Zimbabwean sanctions provisions in line with the other causation
provisions. In deciding how the causation provisions should be made consistent, however, the question arises: What are the policy goals of broad causation provisions and the TransTel settlement stance? Is it to spread U.S. sanctions policy worldwide, to curtail the use of U.S. dollars in questionable
international transactions, or both? The expansive causation language, and
OFAC’s reliance on it and the theory of export of financial services to bring
enforcement actions, serves to do both. As discussed in the Zarrab case,
OFAC has the goal of “precluding transfers designed to dollarize transaction
through the U.S. financial system for the direct or indirect benefit of Iranian
banks or other persons in Iran or the Government of Iran.”221 With respect to
Iran, it has been argued that threats with respect to the Iranian financial system
include, for example, “proliferation financing, nuclear financing, missile financing,” and also “terror financing, money laundering, and sanctions evasion.”222
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There are some limited circumstances in which OFAC allows U.S. financial institutions to be involved in the dollar clearing and settlement process
that would otherwise be prohibited. For instance, in some instances U.S. financial institutions may process transactions (called “U-turn” transactions)
involving U.S. dollars that both originated and terminated outside of the
U.S.223 Such exceptions, however, are few. The general rule applies that U.S.
financial institutions may not be involved, however indirectly, in transactions
with parties subject to U.S. sanctions.
This Article explores, in the following sections, both the options of entirely
expansive and entirely limited causation provisions. It recognizes, however,
that OFAC is far more likely to universally adopt the expansive language were
the office to amend the causation provisions, given OFAC’s goals, priorities,
and use of the expansive causation provision in prior enforcement actions.
Moreover, amending the limited causation provisions rather than the more expansive ones would entail far fewer changes to the actual text of the sanctions
regulations themselves. Therefore, this Article recommends that the instances
of limited causation language within the OFAC sanctions programs relating
to Syria and Zimbabwe be amended to the broader form of the causation provision.
B. Making All “Causing a Violation” Provisions Expansive
The course of action recommended by this Article is to strike the language
limiting prohibited transactions to those by U.S. persons or within the United
States, thereby making the causation provisions found in the Syrian and Zimbabwean OFAC sanctions programs expansive ones. This approach has the
advantage of simplicity and would allow non-U.S. actors to have a consistent
set of expectations as to the permitted uses of U.S. dollars. This would also
have the advantage of making all instances of the causation provisions align
with how expansively OFAC has used the prohibition against the exportation
of services to sanctioned areas or persons. Where the exportation of services
from the United States or by U.S. parties is construed broadly and may also
include the use of offshore payment systems, it may be confusing that the
causation provisions themselves appear to be limited. Therefore, while the
causation provisions by themselves might not necessarily fully indicate the
scope of restrictions on and applicability of U.S. sanctions to U.S. dollar-denominated transactions that are not made within the United States or by U.S.
persons, there will at least not be causation language found in the Syrian or
Zimbabwean sanctions programs that indicates that causation violations are
223
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limited to actions taken within the United States or by U.S. persons. Such
limited causation language might have the effect of creating a mistaken impression that the sanctions regulations do not necessarily attach to U.S. dollardenominated transactions when such transactions do not meet the criteria of
the limited causation provision.
As described above, U.S. dollar transactions do in fact appear to involve a
U.S. party, however tangentially or in a minimal role, at some point in the
dollar clearing and settlement process. The adoption of broad causation language across all U.S. sanctions programs would therefore have the advantage
of clarity for foreign entities. Under this approach, quite simply, transactions
involving U.S. dollars should not be entered into with parties sanctioned by
OFAC, in order to avoid causing a U.S. financial institution to violate the
sanctions regulations and thereby triggering a sanctions violation by the foreign entity itself. This also would make the causation provisions consistent
with an expansive interpretation of the export of financial services, as OFAC
has used in past enforcement actions.
As mentioned above, the broad causation language that appears within the
text of the sanctions regulations does not by itself necessarily indicate the full
applicability of U.S. sanctions, especially where parties outside of the United
States might not expect U.S. sanctions regulations to apply. If broad causation
language were universally adopted across sanctions programs, OFAC would
do well to publicize this development widely, along with its already-existing
prohibition on the export of financial services, and clearly and publicly state
that these terms effectively mean a blanket prohibition against the use of U.S.
dollars with sanctioned entities and individuals, whether or not such transactions are made by the United States or non-U.S. parties. OFAC has recently
made a positive step in its Compliance Framework making clearer its restrictions against the use of U.S. dollars in sanctioned transactions;224 OFAC
should continue this trend with future publications and announcements. Moreover, this Article recommends that when the broad causation provisions are
used as the basis for enforcement actions, OFAC should specifically identify
the nature of the sanctions violation caused–for example, the involvement of
U.S. financial institutions in the dollar clearing and settlement process.
C. Making All “Causing a Violation” Provisions Limited
The “causing a violation” provisions could also all be amended to the limited form of the causation language, to reach only parties within the United
States or actions taken within the United States. This change would limit
OFAC’s reach to those dollar transactions with a clear U.S. nexus, instead of
relying on the sometimes-unclear involvement of U.S. financial institutions in
the dollar clearing and settlement process as the basis for OFAC jurisdiction.
224
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This change might also be in line with the original intent of the drafters of the
causation provisions, as discussed in Part I of this Article. This change, however, might not have great practical effect; OFAC could charge the same type
of conduct based on a theory of exportation of financial services, much as it
has in the other enforcement actions besides TransTel described in Part II of
this Article. Such an amendment of the causation provisions to appear more
limited might cause foreign entities to mistakenly conclude that the U.S. sanctions laws and regulations do not apply to their U.S. dollar transactions with
sanctioned entities, instead of recognizing that such transactions could be penalized through a theory of export of financial services from the United States.
Adopting entirely limited causation provisions would also suffer from the difficulty of defining the nature of boundaries of the “transaction” that must occur within the United States or be taken by a U.S. person to be penalized for
triggering a sanctions violation.
This Article therefore recommends that the causation provisions be
amended so that they are all expansive in nature, rather than being all limited.
This approach would make the causation regulations with the fewest changes
to the text of the regulatory language. This approach would also best reflect
that OFAC currently has the ability to reach U.S. dollar-denominated transactions made outside of the United States without direct involvement of U.S.
persons, and would therefore not contribute to any mistaken impression that
the sanctions regulations did not apply to such transactions.
VII. CONCLUSION
OFAC’s use of the broad causation provisions, and alternatively the prohibitions against the export of services to sanctioned parties or countries, effectively attaches the U.S. sanctions regulations to all U.S. dollar-denominated transactions effected through dollar clearing and settlement systems,
whether those transactions were entered into by U.S. parties or within the
United States. The provisions prohibit the use of U.S. dollars with any sanctioned party where the U.S. dollar is used. The use of the broad causation
provision by OFAC in TransTel to reach a U.S. dollar-denominated transaction entered into outside of the U.S. by non-U.S. parties was novel in that a
broad causation provision was used to reach such conduct, but not in the sense
that OFAC was penalizing types of transactions that had not previously been
subject to OFAC enforcement actions.
As this Article discusses, the TransTel settlement involved the novel use
of the broad causation provision because those broad causation provisions did
not appear to have been developed with the expectation that they would apply
to non-U.S. parties or to transactions outside the United States. Indeed, based
on the language in the Federal Register discussing the North Korean sanctions, the broad causation language perhaps was intended to have the same
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jurisdictional reach as the limited causation language specifically referencing
actions taken by U.S. persons or within the United States. However, the facially expansive text of the broad causation provisions, and the broad general
intended scope of the IEEPA statute to protect the interests of the United
States, mean that the extraterritorial reach of the broad causation provisions is
likely to survive any challenge based on legislative history. An argument that
OFAC does not have the authority to enforce the broad causation principles
extraterritorially in their current form is likely to fail. Although a difference
in the causation principles across OFAC programs may not have been intended, one has arisen. Therefore, the more relevant issue is whether and how
these provisions should be amended across sanctions programs in the future.
This Article concludes that the prohibitions against “causing a violation”
should be made consistent across OFAC sanctions programs in order to allow
actors to develop a clear set of expectations around the use of U.S. dollars by
transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties entered into either by U.S. or nonU.S. entities. Given OFAC’s history in bringing enforcement actions based on
the export of financial services, this Article recommends that all of the causation provisions be amended to be consistent with the broad version of that
language, in order to avoid the impression that only transactions within the
United States or by U.S. persons are subject to OFAC enforcement when they
could also be pursued instead based on the alternative theory of export of financial services.
If OFAC intends in the future to take a position consistent with the
TransTel settlement that all transactions with U.S.-sanctioned parties using
U.S. dollars violate the sanctions provisions, whether entered into by U.S. or
non-U.S. parties, then that stance should be widely publicized in a clear and
consistent manner. Clarity and ease in developing effective compliance
measures, as well as the advancement of the goals of U.S. sanctions programs,
are the primary goals of adopting broad causation provisions across all U.S.
sanctions programs. OFAC can further promote those goals by widely disseminating information about the effect of such causation provisions, and the
prohibitions on the export of financial services, on the application of U.S.
sanctions to transactions involving U.S. dollars.

